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Recent Court Decisions

Recent court and agency decisions involving board work

IASB's Office of General Counsel prepares summaries chosen from the Illinois Supreme and Appellate courts, federal court, agencies, the Illinois Public Access Counselor, and other tribunals issuing interesting decisions. Information in the summaries is limited to a brief synopsis and is not intended for purposes of legal advice. For the complete text of any case cited in this section, go to the Illinois state courts, Illinois Attorney General, or Federal courts finder links.

To search by the names of the plaintiff or defendant or other keyword, use the site search box located at the top of this website. Then filter results by Court Decision.

Questions regarding Recent Court and Agency Decisions should be directed to Maryam Brotine, ext. 1219, or by mbrotine@iasb.com.

Court decisions are listed in order of the date posted, with the most recent shown first.
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  • General Interest to School Officials
    In a Criminal “True Threat” Case, the First Amendment Requires Proof that Defendant had a Subjective Understanding that his Statements were Threatening
    Case: Counterman v. Colorado, 143 S. Ct. 2106 (2023)
    Decision Date: Tuesday, June 27, 2023
    True threats of violence are outside the bounds of First Amendment protection and punishable as crimes. In a 7-2 decision, the Supreme Court held that in a criminal case, the State must show that the Defendant acted with recklessness and had some subjective understanding of the threatening nature of his statements.

    From 2014 to 2016, Defendant-Appellant Billy Counterman sent hundreds of Facebook messages to C.W., a local singer and musician. These included messages that suggested Counterman was surveilling her and that she may come to harm. C.W. suffered from severe anxiety due to these messages, believing that Counterman was threatening her life. Eventually, C.W. contacted the authorities.

    Colorado charged Counterman under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18–3–602(1)(c), which states that it is illegal to “[r]epeatedly ... make[ ] any form of communication with another person” in “a manner that would cause a reasonable person to suffer serious emotional distress and does cause that person ... to suffer serious emotional distress.” The only evidence the State introduced were his Facebook messages. At trial, Counterman was found guilty.

    Counterman appealed. The Colorado law applies an objective standard, looking only at whether a reasonable person would have viewed the Facebook messages as threatening. Instead, Counterman claimed that the First Amendment demands a subjective standard, requiring the State to show that he was aware of the threatening nature of his statements.

    The Supreme Court noted that there are categories of speech that are historically unprotected by the First Amendment, as they are of “such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest” in forbidding them. These include true threats, incitement, defamation, obscenity, and others.

    However, the Supreme Court reasoned that the First Amendment still requires a subjective mental-state requirement to prevent a chilling effect on otherwise protected speech. The Supreme Court held that the lowest level of mental states is sufficient to balance enough breathing space for protected speech without sacrificing too many of the benefits of enforcing laws against true threats. The Supreme Court held that recklessness, or awareness that listeners could regard one’s statements as threatening violence, is the proper standard to apply.

    The Supreme Court vacated the lower court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.

    While this case is not binding in Illinois and involves a state criminal law, the Supreme Court’s focus on a speaker’s subjective intent to make a “true threat” is noteworthy and may impact how schools analyze if expression is a “true threat” exempt from First Amendment protection.

    Michelle Yang, IASB Law Clerk
     
  • Freedom of Information Act - FOIA
    Improper Assessment of Fee for Non-Commercial Request
    Case: Public Access Opinion 23-008
    Decision Date: Friday, May 26, 2023
    On February 15, 2023, Requestor, on behalf of the non-profit organization Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (Council), submitted a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to St. Clair County (County) seeking records regarding flood-related home buyout programs.

    Requestor stated that the purpose of the request is to procure information that will assist vulnerable communities in deciding whether to participate in the Flood Hazard Mitigation program and other similar programs. The County estimated approximately 650 pages of responsive records and a fee of $220, pursuant to Section 6(b) for cost of physical copies of the records and Section 6(f) for cost of searching for and redacting the records. Later, the County found more than 3,000 pages of responsive records and assessed an updated fee of $1,000, pursuant to the same sections.

    Section 6(b) of FOIA states that a public body may charge reasonable fees to reimburse its actual cost for physically reproducing and certifying public records. In calculating the actual cost, the public body may not include the costs of any search for and review of the records or other personnel costs associated with reproducing the records.

    Section 6(f) of FOIA states that a public body may charge fees for personnel costs, including searching for and redacting records, but only for commercial requests.

    On review, the Public Access Counselor (PAC) noted that the County must have treated the request as one with a commercial purpose, as the County cited Section 6(f) for part of the fees. Looking at the definition of “commercial purpose” set out in Section 2(c-10), the PAC held that the request had a non-commercial purpose as there was no indication that the Council intended to use the records for “sale, resale, or solicitation or advertisement for sales or services.”

    The PAC ordered the County to provide the Requestor with copies of the responsive records, subject only to permissible fees for copying under Section 6(a) (records in electronic formats should be provided in an electronic format if possible, with fees charged for cost of the recording medium). No fees should be charged for the search for and review of records.

    This opinion is binding only to the parties involved and may be appealed pursuant to State law.

    Michelle Yang, IASB Law Clerk
     
  • Freedom of Information Act - FOIA
    Failing to Provide Employee Names/Email Addresses in FOIA Request Insufficient to be “Unduly Burdensome"
    Case: Public Access Opinion 23-007
    Decision Date: Friday, May 26, 2023
    On February 16, 2023, Requestor submitted a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the City of Chicago Department of Planning and Development (Department) seeking “all emails, sent or received by [the Department], or circulated internally to the Department, in calendar year 2021, emails all or in part regarding the City-owned property at 6435-6445 N California Ave, commonly known as the former Northtown branch of the Chicago Public Library, and all emails containing any of the following keywords …”

    The Department responded that the Requestor must provide (1) the name or email address of the employee, (2) the timeframe for the email search, and (3) any specific keywords for the search. The Department noted that failing to provide all of the search parameters would require reviewing all emails to determine whether they are relevant to the request, which would be unduly burdensome.

    Section 3(g) of FOIA states that public bodies must comply with requests for all records within a category unless compliance would be unduly burdensome. If compliance is unduly burdensome, the public body must specify the reasons why compliance would be unduly burdensome and the extent to which compliance would burden the operations of the public body.

    On review, the Public Access Counselor (PAC) noted that Requestor had only failed to provide the names/email addresses of employees. Since a public body is typically in a better position than a member of the public to know the names and email addresses of public employees who would have records relating to particular subjects and FOIA only requires that a request reasonably identify a public record, the PAC held that simply failing to provide names/email addresses of specific employees is insufficient to be unduly burdensome. Rather than searching every account, public bodies must make judgment calls about the appropriate personnel to consult.

    This opinion is binding only to the parties involved and may be appealed pursuant to State law.

    Michelle Yang, IASB Law Clerk
     
  • Freedom of Information Act - FOIA
    Duty to Respond to FOIA Requests
    Case: Public Access Opinion 23-006
    Decision Date: Wednesday, May 3, 2023
    On December 13, 2022, a reporter submitted a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the Chicago Public Library (Library) seeking copies of e-mail correspondence concerning Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s appearance at an October 12, 2018, Library event. On December 14, 2023, the Library acknowledged receiving the FOIA request and extended its time to respond by five business days.

    On February 15, 2023, the reporter submitted a Request for Review to the Public Access Counselor (PAC) alleging that the Library had failed to respond to his FOIA request. The PAC forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to the Library and asked whether the Library had provided a substantive response to the FOIA request. The Library did not respond directly but sent the reporter an email on March 3, 2023, copying the PAC. The e-mail stated that the Library planned to expand its search for responsive records and would respond as soon as possible.

    On March 17, 2023, the reporter informed the PAC that the Library still had not substantively responded to his request. On March 24, 2023, the PAC sent a second letter and copies of previous correspondence to the Library’s Director of Government and Public Affairs. The Library did not respond to that letter.

    As of the date of the issuance of this binding opinion, the PAC still has not received information indicating that the Library has provided a substantive response to the reporter’s FOIA request.

    Section 3(d) of FOIA provides that “each public body shall, promptly, either comply with or deny a request for public records within 5 business days after its receipt of the request, unless the time for response is properly extended under subsection (e) of this Section.”

    The PAC concluded that the Library violated section 3(d) of FOIA by failing to comply with, deny in whole or in part, or otherwise appropriately respond to the FOIA request submitted on December 13, 2022.

    The PAC directed the Library to provide the reporter with copies of all records responsive to his December 13, 2022, request, subject only to permissible redactions, if any, under Section 7 of FOIA. If the Library determines that any portion of the responsive records is exempt from disclosure under Section 7, the PAC directed the Library to issue a written denial that fully complies with the requirements of section 9(a) of FOIA.

    This opinion is binding only to the parties involved and may be appealed pursuant to State law.

    Mary H. Bandstra, IASB Law Clerk
     
  • Open Meetings Act - OMA
    Improper Closed Session Discussion of Various Topics Under the Exception for Setting the Price for Sale or Lease of Property
    Case: Public Access Opinion 23-005
    Decision Date: Tuesday, April 25, 2023

    On February 10, 2023, a petitioner submitted a Request for Review to the Public Access Counselor (PAC) alleging that the Board of Trustees for the Lyons Township High School District 204 (Board) violated the Open Meetings Act (OMA) on multiple occasions, including by exceeding the scope of the exception that it cited to enter closed session twice at its January 23, 2023, meeting.

    Section 2(a) of OMA requires that all meetings of public bodies be open to the public unless the subject of the meeting is covered by one of the limited exceptions enumerated in Section 2(c). Exceptions are to be strictly construed, extending only to subjects clearly within their scope. Section 2(c)(6) permits a public body to close a portion of a meeting to discuss “[t]he setting of a price for sale or lease of a property owned by the public body.”

    On January 23, 2023, the Board closed two portions of its meeting to the public to discuss what the Board’s response to the PAC characterized as the next steps in marketing and selling a parcel of property. The Board also discussed in closed session additional topics related to the potential sale of the property, but it did not discuss setting the price of the property.

    The PAC concluded that the Board violated Section 2(a) of OMA by discussing possible courses of action and scenarios that might occur following the Board’s potential rejection of bids, which do not fall within the scope of Section 2(c)(6) of OMA, or any other exception to the general requirement that public bodies conduct public business openly.

    The PAC directed the Board to disclose to petitioner and make publicly available the closed session verbatim recordings and closed session minutes of its January 23, 2023, meeting.

    This opinion is binding only to the parties involved and may be appealed pursuant to State law.

    Mary H. Bandstra, IASB Law Clerk