Recent Court Decisions

This binding opinion from the Illinois Attorney General’s Public Access Counselor (PAC) discusses an issue under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) of whether the City of Chicago (City) Department of Finance (Department) improperly withheld a record responsive to a FOIA request for settlement-related records.

It is the public policy of the State of Illinois that "all persons are entitled to full and complete information regarding the affairs of government." 5 ILCS 140/1. Under FOIA, "(a]ll records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be open to inspection or copying. Any public body that asserts that a record is exempt from disclosure has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that it is exempt." 5 ILCS 140/1.2. Section 7(1)(m) of FOIA exempts from disclosure: “Communications between a public body and an attorney or auditor representing the public body that would not be subject to discovery in litigation, and materials prepared or compiled by or for a public body in anticipation of a criminal, civil or administrative proceeding upon the request of an attorney advising the public body, and materials prepared or compiled with respect to internal audits of public bodies. A party asserting that a communication to an attorney is protected by the attorney-client privilege must show that "(1) a statement originated in confidence that it would not be disclosed; (2) it was made to an attorney acting in his legal capacity for the purpose of securing legal advice or services; and (3) it remained confidential." Cangelosi v. Capasso, 366 Ill. App. 3d 225, 228 (2006). A public body that withholds records under section 7(1)(m) "can meet its burden only by providing some objective indicia that the exemption is applicable under the circumstances." Illinois Education Ass'n v. Illinois State Board of Education, 204 Ill. 2d 456, 470 (2003).

Here, the PAC reviewed the settlement record at issue and was unable to find an indication that legal advice was sought or provided or that the City attorney who signed the record was acting as the Alderman's attorney in connection with the settlement. The City had been dismissed from the case and the Alderman was represented by private counsel. Although part of the record briefly explains the City's involvement in the settlement, neither that statement nor any other portion of the record renders legal advice to the Alderman or indicates that the Alderman sought legal advice pertaining to the litigation and settlement from the City attorney. Rather, the withheld record is a document concerning the settlement which is signed by the Alderman and an attorney with the City's Law Department. The City attorney was representing the City while the Alderman had his own attorney, and the parties had separate interests in the subject that the withheld record addresses.

In addition, the PAC cited to the Illinois Constitution at Article VIII, section 1(c), which provides that "[r]eports and records of the obligation, receipt and use of public funds of the State, units of local government and school districts are public records available for inspection by the public according to law." The constitutional right to information regarding the use of public funds is incorporated into the provisions of FOIA. 5 ILCS 140/2.5. ("All records relating to the obligation, receipt, and use of public funds of the State, units of local government, and school districts are public records subject to inspection and copying by the public.").

The PAC concluded that the public has a constitutional right to know the purposes for which public funds are expended. Because the withheld settlement record relates to such a purpose and because it is not a communication protected by the attorney-client privilege, the Department did not sustain its burden of proving that the record is exempt from disclosure under section 7(1)(m) of FOIA.

A copy of the decision can be found here.
 

In a 6-3 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the FCC’s E-rate program, which supports internet access for schools and millions of students across the country.  Consumers’ Research, an advocacy group, challenged the constitutionality of the funding mechanism for the E-rate program. The group claimed, in part, that Congress had improperly delegated its taxing power because the FCC uses a private entity, the Universal Service Administrative Co., to recommend contribution rates and collect fees that fund the program. The Court found that the FCC was properly exercising its authority to implement the E-rate law, which directs the FCC to collect contributions that are “sufficient” to support the program. 

In a 6-3 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court (Court) ruled that a school board’s refusal to allow parents to opt their children out of classroom instruction involving “LGBTQ+ inclusive” storybooks violated the parents’ right to free exercise of religion under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.

During the 2022-2023 school year, the Montgomery Board of Education (Board) in Maryland approved certain storybooks featuring LGBTQ+ characters and themes for use in the K-12 curriculum, in an effort to better represent the diversity of students and families in the district. The Board expected that teachers would incorporate the books as part of literacy instruction in the classroom.  Initially, the Board notified parents and allowed them to opt their children out of instruction involving the storybooks if they objected to it. However, for the 2023-2024 school year, the Board reversed its decision and prohibited parents from opting their children out of the instruction. The Board determined the volume of opt-out requests from parents had become unmanageable and disruptive to the classroom environment.  The Board was also concerned that permitting some students to leave the classroom while the storybooks were being used would cause other students to experience social stigma and isolation. Parents of elementary school students subsequently filed a lawsuit against the Board, claiming that they should be able to opt their children out of the instruction because their exposure to the books was an unconstitutional burden on the parents’ free exercise of religion, specifically their right to direct the religious upbringing of their children.

The Court examined the storybooks at issue and found they conveyed “normative” messages to young children about sex and gender that were hostile to their parents’ religious beliefs. The Court also noted that discussion guides provided to the teachers encouraged them to reinforce the books’ viewpoints and “reprimand” children who disagreed. Relying on a past decision in which the Court ruled a state could not compel Amish parents to send their children to high school (Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)), the Court held that the use of the storybooks in the curriculum, combined with the Board’s refusal to allow parents to opt out, was an unconstitutional burden on the parents’ free exercise of religion.  Therefore, the parents were entitled to notice and the opportunity to opt-out of instruction involving the books.

In its dissent, the Court’s liberal minority stated that students’ mere exposure to the storybooks in class did not give rise to a free exercise claim.  The minority warned that requiring schools to provide advance notice and the opportunity to opt out of every material that could conflict with parents’ religious beliefs will “impose impossible administrative burdens on schools” and will have “serious chilling effects on public school curricula.” The minority argued that the majority’s holding could mean that schools would need to provide notice and opt-out to parents who have religious objections to books expressing implicit support for women’s rights, interfaith marriage, consumption of meat, and other topics.

Following this decision, districts will need to carefully weigh the risks of introducing or maintaining the use of instructional materials that conflict with parents’ religious beliefs without giving parents the opportunity to opt out of the instruction.      Specific concerns and objections to material used in a school’s curriculum should be reviewed on a case-by-case basis in accordance with school board policy and in consultation with the board attorney.    

On June 12, 2025, the U.S. Supreme Court (Court) issued its opinion in A.J.T., et al. v. Osseo Area Schools, Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 279, et al.  The Court vacated the 8^th circuit court’s decision and remanded the case while setting forth that the same standard must be applied by courts in cases involving alleged failures to accommodate students with disabilities under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (Rehabilitation Act) as in other disability discrimination contexts. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the unanimous opinion for the Court. 

Petitioner A. J. T. is a young female student who suffers from seizures throughout the day that create safety concerns and interfere with her capacity to learn. Her seizures are so frequent in the morning that she “can’t attend school before noon,” however, she is “alert and able to learn” from noon until about 6 p.m. Until middle school, she had been provided reasonable accommodation although at a reduced number of hours for her school day compared with other students. Prior to the start of middle school, the school district proposed further cutting back the length of her school day. A. J. T.’s parents had requested that she receive evening instruction and schooling hours comparable to her nondisabled peers, however, school administrators again denied those requests and also rejected proposals to maintain at least the same length instructional day that A. J. T. had been receiving in elementary school. A. J. T.’s parents filed an IDEA complaint with the Minnesota Department of Education, alleging that the school’s refusal to provide after-hours instruction denied A. J. T. a free appropriate public education. The parents were successful on the IDEA complaint.

A. J. T. and her parents also sued the school district and the Osseo School Board (collectively, the District) in federal court, alleging violations of Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The courts below held that A. J. T.’s claims under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act could not go forward because she had not shown that school officials acted with “bad faith or gross misjudgment.” That heightened standard, the lower courts explained, applies uniquely in the educational services context and requires a more demanding showing compared to other sorts of disability discrimination claims.

The Supreme Court found there was no evidence in the statutory language or legislative history that supported imposing such a high burden on students when other groups with disabilities would not be required to show bad faith or gross misjudgment to bring a discrimination claim. As a result, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the student and determined that students with disabilities filing claims under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act are held to the same standard as other individuals alleging disability discrimination in different contexts.

A copy of the case can be found here. 

The Illinois Supreme Court upheld the conviction of a 16-year-old Stevenson High School student for driving under the influence (DUI) during a driver’s education class.
The Village of Lincolnshire (Village) brought state DUI charges against the student, who was later found guilty in a bench trial. The student appealed and his case made its way to the Illinois Supreme Court, where he argued that the Village lacked authority to prosecute the DUI, and that the evidence was insufficient to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of DUI.
 

First, the student claimed that the Village lacked authority to prosecute the DUI because it failed to present written permission from the State authorizing the Village to prosecute the case under state statute. The parties agreed that the Village did have such written permission in this case. The statute at issue does not require the Village to submit its written permission into the record. Both the Appellate Court and the Illinois Supreme Court rejected the arguments presented, and held that the statute does not require the Village to submit written authority into the record at trial.
 

Second, the student argued that the Village failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was under the influence of cannabis, and that it was to a degree that “rendered him incapable of safely driving.” In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the  court must determine whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found the required elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
 

The Illinois Supreme Court noted that at trial, the Village presented testimony from the driver’s education teacher, who observed many concerns with the student’s driving that day. The student did not look over his shoulder or check the car’s rearview mirror when backing out. While driving, the student veered into the outside lane as he turned left into the inside lane, causing the teacher to grab the wheel to avoid a car approaching on the right, and the student continued veering left and right as he drove down the road. The teacher grabbed the wheel several times to put the student back into the proper lane. As the student approached a stop sign, the teacher had to use the brake on his side of the car to stop the vehicle because defendant “wasn’t going to come to a complete stop,” and again had to use the brake when the student approached a stoplight. After the drive, the Dean assigned to the student was called. The Dean spoke with defendant and testified that his speech was slow, he was confused, and he could not respond quickly to questioning. The Dean was concerned and walked the student to the nurse’s office thinking the student needed to be checked out medically. Afterwards, the Dean interviewed the student, who told her that he had been up all night because he had been using marijuana in the evening and that his mother caught him.
 

Given the admission about using marijuana, the Dean called another dean of students at the high school, and asked for a student search of defendant. That other dean searched the student and found a skinny, white, rolled object in the student’s wallet. The student said that it was a marijuana cigarette.  The Dean then called a Village police officer who was employed by the high school as a school resource officer. The resource officer conducted a balance assessment on the student, who kept falling over, losing his balance and catching himself with his other foot or his hand. After failing the field sobriety tests, the officer informed the student that he would be arrested. Additional evidence was submitted into the record of surveillance footage from the high school showing the student stumbling through the school hallways before exiting to the driver’s education vehicle. In addition, field sobriety tests were conducted in the booking room at the police station. Those tests were video recorded, admitted into evidence, and played for the trial court. That police officer also determined that the student was under the influence. The trial court found defendant guilty of DUI (cannabis).
 

When viewing all evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the evidence supported a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the student was under influence of cannabis and was incapable of safely driving, upholding his conviction.
 

A copy of the case is available here.