This binding opinion from the Illinois Attorney General’s Public Access Counselor (PAC) discusses an issue under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) of whether the City of Chicago (City) Department of Law (Department) improperly withheld records responsive to a FOIA request seeking correspondence involving Mr. Robert Blackwell Jr.’s companies and the City. The records requested are messages and documents exchanged between Robert Blackwell, Jr., and the City's then-Chief Operating Officer, Paul Goodrich, involving City contracts. The Department's response to the PAC stated that those records were subsequently "received by an attorney for the City from a client-department as part of the client's seeking legal guidance” and therefore exempt from disclosure under FOIA.

It is the public policy of the State of Illinois that "all persons are entitled to full and complete information regarding the affairs of government." 5 ILCS 140/1. Under FOIA, "(a]ll records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be open to inspection or copying. Any public body that asserts that a record is exempt from disclosure has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that it is exempt." 5 ILCS 140/1.2.

Section 7(1)(m) of FOIA exempts from disclosure: “Communications between a public body and an attorney or auditor representing the public body that would not be subject to discovery in litigation, and materials prepared or compiled by or for a public body in anticipation of a criminal, civil or administrative proceeding upon the request of an attorney advising the public body, and materials prepared or compiled with respect to internal audits of public bodies. 

A party asserting that a communication to an attorney is protected by the attorney-client privilege must show that: (1) a statement originated in confidence that it would not be disclosed; (2) it was made to an attorney acting in his legal capacity for the purpose of securing legal advice or services; and (3) it remained confidential." Cangelosi v. Capasso, 366 Ill. App. 3d 225, 228 (2006). A public body that withholds records under section 7(1)(m) "can meet its burden only by providing some objective indicia that the exemption is applicable under the circumstances." Illinois Education Ass'n v. Illinois State Board of Education, 204 Ill. 2d 456, 470 (2003). 

In Johnson v. Frontier Ford, Inc., 68 Ill. App. 3d 315, 317 (1979), the Illinois Appellate Court addressed whether the attorney-client privilege protects pre-existing documents forwarded by a client to their attorney in connection with a request for legal advice. The Court reasoned such records are not protected unless the privilege otherwise applied before the attorney obtained them.

Here, the PAC reviewed the records at issue and determined that the records requested were not exempt from disclosure pursuant to Section 7(1)(m) because the withheld records did not originate in confidence between parties engaged in an attorney-client relationship and were not exchanged for the purpose of securing or providing legal advice. The PAC further noted that, “sending an attorney communications exchanged by a City employee and a third-party contractor for the City does not transform those records into privileged attorney-client communications.” The PAC concluded that the Department did not sustain its burden of demonstrating that the records are exempt from disclosure pursuant to section 7(1)(m) of FOIA. The PAC determined that the Department improperly withheld the contested record and directed the Department to provide unredacted copies of the withheld records to the requester.

A copy of the decision can be found here.

A member of the public submitted a request for review to the Illinois Attorney General's Public Access Counselor's office (PAC) alleging that the Village of Okawville Board of Trustees (Board) violated the Open Meetings Act (OMA) section 2.02 of OMA (5 ILCS 120/) during a public meeting by terminating a police officer after failing to provide sufficient advance notice in the meeting agenda of the proposed termination action.  

Section 2.02(c) of OMA requires that a meeting agenda "set forth the general subject matter of any resolution or ordinance that will be the subject of final action at the meeting." This provision requires public bodies to include in agendas sufficient detail to notify members of the public of the types of final actions that public bodies anticipate taking at their meetings. The term “general subject matter” is ambiguous according to the PAC. Through legislative history, the PAC noted that the General Assembly chose to change in 2013 from the phrase, which had only required that an action be “germane to a subject on the agenda,” to “general subject matter.” At a minimum, section 2.02(c) requires the Board's agenda to include the general category of employee and the general type of personnel transaction at issue. 

Section 2(c)(1) of OMA permits closed session discussion regarding "[t]he appointment, employment, compensation, discipline, performance, or dismissal of specific employees of the public body[.]" However, the Board's public recital before entering closed session, which is required by section 2a of OMA, has no relevance to whether the Board's meeting agenda provided sufficient advance notice as separately required by section 2.02(c) of OMA.

Here, the Board’s meeting agenda listed “Personnel Issues” under a heading for “Police & Liquor.” The agenda also contained a reference to holding a closed session to discuss “personnel” under the exception in section 2(c)(1) of OMA. There was no inclusion in the agenda of any advance notice that the Board would take action to terminate the employment of a police officer. The PAC surmised that a member of the public could only possibly discern from the combined information on the agenda that personnel issues about either a police or liquor employee or potential employee would be discussed by the Board during closed session regarding one of the employment actions under 2(c)(1).  

The PAC found that the meeting agenda did not set forth the general subject matter of the Board's vote to terminate the employment of a police officer. The agenda item identified neither the employee category at issue nor the type of personnel transaction to be considered by the Board. The PAC determined that a member of the public who read the agenda before the meeting would not have generally known what the Board would be acting upon, and therefore, the Board failed to provide sufficient advance notice for the termination of a police officer's employment as required by section 2.02(c). 

The PAC directed the Board to remedy this violation by re-voting on the termination of the employee after posting a meeting agenda that provides sufficient detail to identify the general subject of that final action. At a minimum, the PAC set the requirement that the Board should create a relevant agenda item that would identify the category of employee and the type of personnel action to be considered at the meeting. 

A copy of the decision can be found here.

A member of the public submitted a request for review to the Illinois Attorney General's Public Access Counselor's office (PAC) alleging that the City of Lebanon (City) City Council (Council) violated the Open Meetings Act (OMA) section 2(a) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/) during two separate public meetings by discussing topics in closed session that are not authorized by any of the exceptions to the general requirement that public bodies conduct public business openly. 

Section 2(a) of OMA requires that "[a]ll meetings of public bodies shall be open to the public unless excepted in subsection (c) and closed in accordance with Section 2a." Such exceptions “are in derogation of the requirement that public bodies meet in the open, and therefore, the exceptions are to be strictly construed, extending, only to subjects clearly within their scope.” 

The City Council relied on section 2(c)(5) of OMA to close the December 22, 2025, and February 9, 2026, meetings in relation to setting prices for the sale or lease of property. The section 2(c)(5) exception applies to the “purchase or lease of real property for the use of the public body, including meetings held for the purpose of discussing whether a particular parcel should be acquired.”

Here, the Council’s closed session discussions at the December 22, 2025, and February 9, 2026, meetings concerned the merits of properties that the City potentially could purchase. Closed session discussion of those properties was authorized under Section 2(c)(5) of OMA. However, the Council’s discussion of its future plans for the current City Hall building were not authorized for closed session under Section 2(c)(5).

The PAC found that the Council violated OMA during its December 22, 2025, and February 9, 2026, meetings by improperly discussing the existing City Hall building in closed session. The PAC determined that the discussions of potential property purchases and future plans for current city buildings could have been separated from the discussion of the existing property.

The PAC directed the Council to remedy the violation by disclosing its closed session verbatim recordings and closed session minutes from the December 22, 2025, and February 9, 2026, meetings concerning the current City Hall building to the requestor and the public. The PAC allowed the Council to redact the portions of the recordings and minutes concerning the potential acquisition of other properties, which is covered by the closed meeting exception under Section 2(c)(5).

A copy of the decision can be found here.

A trustee on the Village of Caseyville (Village) Board of Trustees (Board) submitted a Request for Review to the Illinois Attorney General’s Public Access Counselor’s office (PAC) for an alleged violation of the Open Meetings Act (OMA) for failing to follow the proper procedure for entering closed session and by holding a closed session discussion that was not authorized by any of the exceptions to the general requirement that public bodies conduct public business openly. The trustee alleged that the Village’s mayor called for a closed session at the Board’s January 21, 2026, meeting under the pretext of discussing “personnel issues” but instead discussed outstanding T.I.F. loans.

Section 2a of OMA provides that “[a] public body may hold a meeting closed to the public, or close a portion of a meeting to the public, upon a majority vote of a quorum present, taken at a meeting open to the public for which notice has been given as required by this Act.” Section 2a of OMA further requires that each board member’s vote on holding a meeting in closed session be accompanied with a citation of the specific exception in Section 2 of OMA which authorizes the closed session of the meeting from the public. The votes and citation to the specific exception granted by Section 2 “shall be publicly disclosed at the time of the vote and shall be recorded and entered into the minutes of the meeting.”

Section 2(c)(11) of OMA provides that public bodies may hold closed meetings to consider any of the enumerated 39 exceptions listed in the Section that permit public bodies to discuss particular topics in closed session. The exceptions are intended to be strictly construed and extended to the subjects clearly within the scope of the respective exception identified by the board.

Here, the trustee alleged the Board inappropriately entered into closed session during the January 21, 2026 board meeting for “personnel issues.” The Board argued that its closed session discussion of the overdue Tax Increment Financing (TIF) loans were authorized by Section 2(c)(11) of OMA, permitting the closed session to discuss “litigation, when an action against…the public body has been filed and is pending before a court or administrative tribunal, or when the public body finds that an action is probable or imminent…” The recording of the open session portion of the meeting reflected that the Board did not cite a specific exception from section 2(c) as a basis for closing its January 21, 2026, meeting. The Board also did not record and enter into the minutes the exception authorizing it to close a portion of the meeting. The PAC determined the Board violated section 2a of OMA.

The PAC’s review determined that on January 21, 2026, the Board closed a portion of its meeting to the public and failed to find that litigation was probable or imminent or record and enter into the closed session minutes the basis for such a finding, as required by Section 2(c)(11). The closed session discussion concerning the overdue TIF loans did not pertain to pending, probable, or imminent litigation. The PAC determined that the Board violated section 2(a) of OMA by discussing in closed session matters outside the scope of section 2(c)(11) of OMA. The PAC directed the Board to remedy this violation by making the closed session verbatim recording of its January 21, 2026 meeting available to the public.

A copy of the decision can be found here.

A member of the public submitted a request for review to the Illinois Attorney General's Public Access Counselor's office (PAC) alleging that the Village of Sauk Village Board of Trustees (Board) violated the Open Meetings Act (OMA) section 2.06(g) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/) during a public meeting by interrupting her public comment.  

Section 2.06(g) of OMA provides that "[a]ny person shall be permitted an opportunity to address public officials under the rules established and recorded by the public body." This provision "generally precludes a public body from imposing restrictions on public comment that are not set out in its established and recorded rules." Ill. Att'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 23-013, issued September 13, 2023, at 3. Section 2.06(g) of OMA guarantees "an opportunity to address public officials" which implies the right to state the names of public officials so it is clear to whom the comments are directed and does not permit a public body to enforce public comment rules that impose unconstitutional restrictions on speech during public meetings. The PAC cited to a case in its opinion involving a school district which stood for the general rule that if a prohibition on the use of names of public officials and employees is intended to shield public officials from criticism, then those restrictions on such type of criticism during open meetings is deemed unconstitutional.” An open meeting of a public body typically constitutes a designated public forum where the first amendment to the United States Constitution ordinarily permits only "'reasonable time, place and manner restrictions on public participation" which are content-neutral and "serve a significant government interest[.]" Ill. Att'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 14-009, at 4.

Here, the member of the public alleged that the Mayor interrupted her during public comment so that she could not state the names of Board trustees, turned off the audio system, and asked the Police Chief to remove her from the meeting. The Board’s response to the PAC cited two sections of the Village’s Municipal Code that dealt with failing to yield the floor after time has expired and another section that referred to Robert’s Rules of Order relevant to decorum at public meetings. 

The PAC noted that in general a public body would not necessarily violate section 2.06(g) of OMA by interrupting or stopping comments that are inflammatory that cause a disruption because the content is profane or insulting. However, the PAC distinguished the situation by the fact that the Mayor instigated a conflict with the member of the public by objecting to her use of the names of the trustees and stating that her time was expired even though her three minutes provided for under the Board’s public comment rules had not expired. The PAC found it unclear how section 2.06(g) could be satisfied by an established and recorded rule that prohibits speakers from stating the names of the members of the public body that they address. Section 2.06(g) of OMA does not permit a public body to enforce public comment rules that impose unconstitutional restrictions on speech during public meetings. The PAC concluded that the member of the public did not disrupt the order and decorum of the meeting and the Board violated section 2.06(g) of OMA.

A copy of the decision can be found here.

Note: To contrast this PAC opinion, a court of appeals for the Fourth Circuit (Court) (not covering Illinois and not binding on Illinois schools) upheld a school board's policy prohibiting public comments that target, criticize, or attack individual students, as long as it was applied in a nondiscriminatory manner.  In that case, the Board interrupted the speaker only when they violated the specific policy. The Court held that the Board’s meeting was a limited public forum and its policy was a reasonable restriction on speech.

A copy of the decision can be found here.