Recent Court Decisions

Two candidates challenged the election results for local school council (LSC) members of a Chicago public school. These elections are governed by rules developed by the Chicago Board of Education rather than the Election Code. The challengers complained of the improper use of school resources as well as improper distribution of campaign literature on election day. The hearing officer for the Chicago Board of Education conducted a hearing in accordance with the Board’s rules. In reviewing his decision, the Illinois Court of Appeals found no error in his conclusion that the facts demonstrated no “substantial and uncured election violations.”

UPDATE: The Illinois Supreme Court held that an employment contract is not the kind of record the General Assembly intended to keep from public view and does not fall within the exemption for personnel files in section 7(1)(b) of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).

The Illinois Supreme Court agreed that remand for the circuit court to privately inspect the contract is appropriate, but disagreed as to the scope of the inspection. It directed the circuit court to determine whether it contains personal information (such as a social security number or bank account information) which, if disclosed, would constitute an unwarranted invasion of the superintendent’s personal privacy. That information must be deleted. See 5 ILCS 140/8.

But, the Court was clear that the circuit court's inspection is not to become a battle of details where the circuit court determines whether each individual paragraph or subsection bears on the superintendent’s public duties.

Therefore, an employment contract, as a whole, bears on the employee’s public duties and, moreover, constitutes a “contract dealing with the expenditure of public or other funds of public bodies”; (5 ILCS 140/2(c)(vii)) and, with the exception noted above for personal information, the superintendent’s employment contract must be disclosed in its entirety.

HISTORY OF THIS CASE:

In Stern v. Wheaton-Warrenville Community Unit School District 200, No. 107139. (November 26, 2008), the Illinois Supreme Court granted a petition for leave to appeal to determine whether the trial court properly denied plaintiff's FOIA request for a copy of the superintendent's contract. The trial court found that the superintendent's employment contract was per se exempt under FOIA because it was part of his personnel file.

Before the petition for leave to appeal was filed, the Appellate Court reversed the trial court and found that public employees' employment contracts were subject to disclosure under FOIA with respect to information bearing on public duties. The Appellate Court also found that there were issues of material fact regarding whether any portion of the subject contract was exempt under FOIA.

The Appellate Court issued its opinion on June 9, 2008. Then, it modified and superseded its opinion when it denied a rehearing on July 11, 2008. After that, the Appellate Court withdrew its opinion on July 25, 2008 and modified it on August 12, 2008. The petition for leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court was granted on November 26, 2008.

IASB's October 2008 Newsbulletin's Recent Developments in School Law column discussed the issues in this case and why they are important for school officials to be aware of, understand and watch.

An unsuccessful school board candidate filed an election contest and prevailed in the circuit court of Will County. Upon the school board member’s motion, the circuit court awarded costs against the county clerk. The clerk appealed. The Appellate Court reversed. It held that no statutory authority exists to award costs to a candidate challenging an election. The section of the Election Code providing that an election contest be tried in a like manner as "other civil cases" incorporates only the provisions contained in the Civil Practice Law, and not the other provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure governing an award of costs.

A former school board member appealed the court order that “ousted” him from serving on a school board for violating the Public Officer Prohibited Activities Act (50 ILCS 105/). That statute prohibits duly holding offices on both a county board and a school board. A few fellow school board members brought an action in “quo warranto” to enforce this law because the former board member was a member of the county board when he was sworn in to the school board. (“Quo warranto” is a legal proceeding that challenges an individual's right to hold an office or governmental privilege.) The appellate court found, among other things, that the court order at the time was proper. Note: During the course of this case, the former school board member ran for the school board again at the next election, and he was elected, sworn in, and is currently serving. For more information about incompatible offices, see the discussion in the Illinois Council of School Attorney’s document titled “Answers to FAQs; Conflict of Interest and Incompatible Offices,” at http://iasb.com/law/FAQsConflictofInterestIncompatibleOffices.pdf.

Simultaneously holding offices as a county board member and a school board member violates the Public Officer Prohibited Activities Act. In this case, the Kankakee County State’s Attorney sought an order seeking the ouster of a county board member. The individual first held the office of county board member before being elected to the school board. The Public Officer Prohibited Activities Act prohibits a county board member from holding any other office, except for several specifically enumerated circumstances not relevant here. The statute states that any such election is void. Therefore, rather than voiding the county board seat, the court voided the county board member’s election to the school board.

This decision has narrow applicability because it is based on a statute limiting county board members from holding a second office. The broader doctrine of incompatible offices is rooted in the principle of separation of offices as provided in the Illinois Constitution. The doctrine is intended to assure high quality performance with undivided loyalty. Appellate decisions have held that incompatibility arises if the duties of one office would necessarily prevent the office holder from faithfully performing all the duties of the other office. Under the doctrine of incompatible offices, the acceptance of an incompatible office is regarded by operation of law as a resignation from the first office.