Recent Court Decisions

The following case is binding in the jurisdiction of the Illinois Appellate Court Third Circuit. Its content may be of interest to school officials in Illinois. It involves a “quo warranto” action. “Quo warranto” actions used to challenge another's right to public office. For more information on quo warranto actions, see the last paragraph below.

Parker, a candidate for the school board, had two felony convictions and filed his papers to become a candidate for his local school board. The State’s Attorney sought a court order to remove Parker’s name from the ballot and stop him from running for the school board. The basis for the request was that Parker was not eligible to run because his felony convictions disqualified him from holding public office pursuant to section 29-15 of the Election Code (10 ILCS 5/29-15). The trial court granted the State's quo warranto motion and barred General Parker from placing his name on the ballot. On appeal, the appellate court upheld the order barring General Parker from placing his name on the ballot.

Quo warranto cases are generally only brought by the Attorney General or the appropriate State's Attorney. If neither of them brings the suit, it may be brought by any citizen after s/he has requested the AG and State's Attorney to bring the same, they fail to do so, and the circuit court grants permission for the citizen to file it. After receiving permission to bring the suit, the citizen must post a bond when filing the proceeding because, if s/he is unsuccessful, s/he must pay the defendant’s attorney fees and costs. Depending upon the alleged violation, the law allows the court to impose a $25,000 fine or remove the board member from office.

A copy of this case is available at the following location:

www.state.il.us/court/R23_Orders/AppellateCourt/2012/3rdDistrict/3110140_R23.pdf

The State of Illinois filed a complaint against the Defendant, who held three public offices: alderman, school board member, and park district commissioner. The State sought Defendant’s removal from the office of park district commissioner, alleging it was incompatible with Defendant’s position as alderman. The First District Appellate Court held that the offices of alderman, school board member, and park district commissioner were incompatible, and removed Defendant from all three offices. There does not need to be an actual conflict for offices to be incompatible, just that there will eventually be a conflict. Offices are incompatible when the functions or duties of the offices are inherently inconsistent and repugnant so that one person would be unable to faithfully, impartially, and efficiently discharge the duties of both offices. The Court reasoned that the positions of alderman and park commissioner were incompatible because of contractual relations that may exist between a park district and municipality. A conflict can also arise between an alderman’s duties in voting on the allocation of revenue-sharing funds to a school district, and a school board member’s duty to provide revenue to maintain schools.

Nicole Cudiamat, IASB Extern

A three-member Board of Trustees (Board) held a meeting where two of its members attended. Two members equal a quorum on this type of public body. The members who attended the meeting were Mr. Bertrand and Ms. Mallory. During the meeting, they went into closed session to discuss a proposed settlement agreement of a lawsuit against the Board, brought by Mr. Bertrand. When the closed session ended, Ms. Mallory moved for the Board to approve a settlement agreement with Mr. Bertrand. Mr. Bertrand seconded the motion. Ms. Mallory voted “yea,” and Mr. Bertrand abstained from voting. The Board considered the motion passed.

Community members sued the Board over this motion. Then, the Ill. Attorney General intervened (took over). It argued that the settlement agreement was void for two reasons: (1) Mr. Bertrand’s actions violated section 3(a) of the Public Officer Prohibited Activities Act (“Act”) because he participated in the negotiation of the settlement agreement, and (2) Ms. Mallory’s one yea vote out of a quorum of two members did not equal a majority to pass the motion for approval of the settlement agreement.

Agreeing with both arguments, the court held the settlement agreement was void. First, the court held that Mr. Bertrand had personal pecuniary interests that conflicted with his duty not to use his elected office for his own financial gain. Conflict of interest statutes are passed to “discourage this type of ethical dilemma and the abuses that stem from it.” Second, the court held that although the Board had a quorum and could legally hold a meeting with a quorum of two, one vote for the proposed settlement agreement was not enough to pass the motion. A majority means the number greater than half of any total. When an affirmative vote of yes is required (e.g., expenditures of money), then only an actual “yea” or “aye” vote is counted toward passage of the motion. Any abstention or attempt to vote other than “yea” or “aye”, including abstaining, operates as a “nay” vote. Mr. Bertrand’s abstention had the effect of a “nay” vote.

A school district placed a referendum on the ballot seeking to increase the school’s property tax limiting rate. The school district engaged in a number of activities to encourage voters to support the referendum, including hosting a student rally, producing a television program, mailing referendum literature, allowing teachers to blog on the subject, and providing school space to pro-referendum groups.

Although the referendum was defeated, Mr. Peraica and Taxpayers United of America (TUA) filed suit against the school district. The group claimed that the school district had deprived them of the right to free speech under the first amendment to the United States Constitution, because they were “forced to struggle against the public funds” in their opposition to the referendum. The taxpayer group alleged that the school deprived them of a constitutional right under the appearance of authority, in violation of section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act.

The Illinois Fourth Division appellate court agreed with the trial court’s dismissal of the claims in favor of the school district.

NOTE: Two of the group’s claims did not reach appeal:

1. Mr. Peraica and TUA had claimed that the school violated the Property Tax Code by understating the amount of the tax increase.

2. Mr. Peraica and TUA had alleged that the school violated section 9-25.1 of the Illinois Election Code, which says that schools cannot use public funds in support of a proposition. The court replied that claims under the Election Code are properly made to the Board of Elections.

Referendums are complicated and school officials should always consult the board attorney throughout the process.

Brennan McLoughlin, IASB Law Clerk

This appeal continues from the summer of 2012 when Roxana Comm. Unit School Dist. No. 1 (RCUSD) asked for and was granted an injunction against the Illinois Pollution Control Board (PCB).

The injunction ordered the PCB to (1) stop violating the OMA and (2) hold all of its future meetings in public. See Roxana CUSD #1 v. WRB Refining, LP and EPA, Pollution Control Board & Dept. of Revenue, Ill. App. 4th 120331 (2012) (available in RC&AD archives).

The injunction only stopped the PCB from violating OMA during further proceedings pertaining to the parties of this case. The question of whether or not the PCB violated FOIA and OMA was to occur at a later date.

At that later date, the PCB won its motion for summary judgment in the trial court. This decision effectively stopped a trial on the question of whether the PCB violated the Illinois FOIA and OMA. RCUSD appealed this decision.

The Illinois Appellate Court reversed and remanded the case (sent it back to the trial court). On appeal, the Appellate court found as follows:

1. The PCB violated FOIA by not providing public records requested as statutorily mandated.

2. The PCB violated the mandates and overarching purpose of the OMA when it improperly prohibited public comment, restricted opportunity to address it during public comment to written filings, and discussed the merits of RCUSD’s claims in closed sessions.

For another related appeal out of this situation, please see Roxana Community Unit School Dist. No. 1 v. Environmental Protection Agency, --- N.E.2d ---, 2013 IL App (4th) 120825 (November 14, 2013) (available in the RC&AD District Organization and Operation section).