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Recent Court Decisions

Recent court and agency decisions involving board work

IASB's Office of General Counsel prepares summaries chosen from the Illinois Supreme and Appellate courts, federal court, agencies, the Illinois Public Access Counselor, and other tribunals issuing interesting decisions. Information in the summaries is limited to a brief synopsis and is not intended for purposes of legal advice. For the complete text of any case cited in this section, go to the Illinois state courts, Illinois Attorney General, or Federal courts finder links.

To search by the names of the plaintiff or defendant or other keyword, use the site search box located at the top of this website. Then filter results by Court Decision.

Questions regarding Recent Court and Agency Decisions should be directed to Maryam Brotine, ext. 1219, or by [email protected].

Court decisions are listed in order of the date posted, with the most recent shown first.

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  • Open Meetings Act - OMA
    Public Body Violated OMA for Voting to Terminate Employment after Failing to Provide Sufficient Advance Notice on the Board’s Meeting Agenda
    Case: Binding Opinion – 26-005
    Decision Date: Friday, May 15, 2026

    A member of the public submitted a request for review to the Illinois Attorney General's Public Access Counselor's office (PAC) alleging that the Village of Okawville Board of Trustees (Board) violated the Open Meetings Act (OMA) section 2.02 of OMA (5 ILCS 120/) during a public meeting by terminating a police officer after failing to provide sufficient advance notice in the meeting agenda of the proposed termination action.  

    Section 2.02(c) of OMA requires that a meeting agenda "set forth the general subject matter of any resolution or ordinance that will be the subject of final action at the meeting." This provision requires public bodies to include in agendas sufficient detail to notify members of the public of the types of final actions that public bodies anticipate taking at their meetings. The term “general subject matter” is ambiguous according to the PAC. Through legislative history, the PAC noted that the General Assembly chose to change in 2013 from the phrase, which had only required that an action be “germane to a subject on the agenda,” to “general subject matter.” At a minimum, section 2.02(c) requires the Board's agenda to include the general category of employee and the general type of personnel transaction at issue. 

    Section 2(c)(1) of OMA permits closed session discussion regarding "[t]he appointment, employment, compensation, discipline, performance, or dismissal of specific employees of the public body[.]" However, the Board's public recital before entering closed session, which is required by section 2a of OMA, has no relevance to whether the Board's meeting agenda provided sufficient advance notice as separately required by section 2.02(c) of OMA.

    Here, the Board’s meeting agenda listed “Personnel Issues” under a heading for “Police & Liquor.” The agenda also contained a reference to holding a closed session to discuss “personnel” under the exception in section 2(c)(1) of OMA. There was no inclusion in the agenda of any advance notice that the Board would take action to terminate the employment of a police officer. The PAC surmised that a member of the public could only possibly discern from the combined information on the agenda that personnel issues about either a police or liquor employee or potential employee would be discussed by the Board during closed session regarding one of the employment actions under 2(c)(1).  

    The PAC found that the meeting agenda did not set forth the general subject matter of the Board's vote to terminate the employment of a police officer. The agenda item identified neither the employee category at issue nor the type of personnel transaction to be considered by the Board. The PAC determined that a member of the public who read the agenda before the meeting would not have generally known what the Board would be acting upon, and therefore, the Board failed to provide sufficient advance notice for the termination of a police officer's employment as required by section 2.02(c). 

    The PAC directed the Board to remedy this violation by re-voting on the termination of the employee after posting a meeting agenda that provides sufficient detail to identify the general subject of that final action. At a minimum, the PAC set the requirement that the Board should create a relevant agenda item that would identify the category of employee and the type of personnel action to be considered at the meeting. 

    A copy of the decision can be found here.

  • Open Meetings Act - OMA
    Public Body Violated OMA for Restricting Public Comment at Meeting
    Case: Binding Opinion – 26-001
    Decision Date: Wednesday, January 21, 2026

    A member of the public submitted a request for review to the Illinois Attorney General's Public Access Counselor's office (PAC) alleging that the Village of Sauk Village Board of Trustees (Board) violated the Open Meetings Act (OMA) section 2.06(g) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/) during a public meeting by interrupting her public comment.  

    Section 2.06(g) of OMA provides that "[a]ny person shall be permitted an opportunity to address public officials under the rules established and recorded by the public body." This provision "generally precludes a public body from imposing restrictions on public comment that are not set out in its established and recorded rules." Ill. Att'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 23-013, issued September 13, 2023, at 3. Section 2.06(g) of OMA guarantees "an opportunity to address public officials" which implies the right to state the names of public officials so it is clear to whom the comments are directed and does not permit a public body to enforce public comment rules that impose unconstitutional restrictions on speech during public meetings. The PAC cited to a case in its opinion involving a school district which stood for the general rule that if a prohibition on the use of names of public officials and employees is intended to shield public officials from criticism, then those restrictions on such type of criticism during open meetings is deemed unconstitutional.” An open meeting of a public body typically constitutes a designated public forum where the first amendment to the United States Constitution ordinarily permits only "'reasonable time, place and manner restrictions on public participation" which are content-neutral and "serve a significant government interest[.]" Ill. Att'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 14-009, at 4.

    Here, the member of the public alleged that the Mayor interrupted her during public comment so that she could not state the names of Board trustees, turned off the audio system, and asked the Police Chief to remove her from the meeting. The Board’s response to the PAC cited two sections of the Village’s Municipal Code that dealt with failing to yield the floor after time has expired and another section that referred to Robert’s Rules of Order relevant to decorum at public meetings. 

    The PAC noted that in general a public body would not necessarily violate section 2.06(g) of OMA by interrupting or stopping comments that are inflammatory that cause a disruption because the content is profane or insulting. However, the PAC distinguished the situation by the fact that the Mayor instigated a conflict with the member of the public by objecting to her use of the names of the trustees and stating that her time was expired even though her three minutes provided for under the Board’s public comment rules had not expired. The PAC found it unclear how section 2.06(g) could be satisfied by an established and recorded rule that prohibits speakers from stating the names of the members of the public body that they address. Section 2.06(g) of OMA does not permit a public body to enforce public comment rules that impose unconstitutional restrictions on speech during public meetings. The PAC concluded that the member of the public did not disrupt the order and decorum of the meeting and the Board violated section 2.06(g) of OMA.

    A copy of the decision can be found here.

    Note: To contrast this PAC opinion, a court of appeals for the Fourth Circuit (Court) (not covering Illinois and not binding on Illinois schools) upheld a school board's policy prohibiting public comments that target, criticize, or attack individual students, as long as it was applied in a nondiscriminatory manner.  In that case, the Board interrupted the speaker only when they violated the specific policy. The Court held that the Board’s meeting was a limited public forum and its policy was a reasonable restriction on speech.

    A copy of the decision can be found here.

  • Freedom of Information Act - FOIA
    A Public Body Violated FOIA By Charging a Fee for Redactions
    Case: Binding Opinion – PAC 25-014
    Decision Date: Wednesday, December 3, 2025
    This binding opinion from the Illinois Attorney General’s Public Access Counselor (PAC) discusses an issue under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) of whether the Mattoon Police Department (Department) improperly charged a fee for redaction of responsive records. An individual requester sought copies of body camera video footage related to an incident he was involved in. The Department identified the records containing four to five hours of video footage and responded to the requester that the responsive video would have to be redacted. The Department indicated that the requester would have to submit payment in advance and offered to the requester the opportunity to narrow his request in order to reduce the cost assessed.  The requester responded by requesting an itemized cost estimate of charges the Department intended to charge. The Department responded with an estimate of $696.60 (for 4.5 hours of video footage at the rate of $2.58 per minute of redacting). The requester then filed a request for review with the PAC contesting that fee by arguing that the charges were based on redaction costs, which are not chargeable by statute.

    It is the public policy of the State of Illinois that "all persons are entitled to full and complete information regarding the affairs of government." 5 ILCS 140/1. "It is a fundamental obligation of government to operate openly and provide public records as expediently and efficiently as possible in compliance with this Act." Id. Section 1 of FOIA states that "[t]he General Assembly recognizes that this Act imposes fiscal obligations on public bodies to provide adequate staff and equipment to comply with its requirements." Id. "Subject to the fee provisions of Section 6 of this Act, each public body shall promptly provide, to any person who submits a request, a copy of any public record required to be disclosed by subsection (a) of this Section and shall certify such copy if so requested." 5 ILCS 140/3(b).

    Section 6(a) of FOIA requires a public body to provide records maintained in an electronic format to the requester in the "electronic format specified by the requester, if feasible[,]" and limits the fees that a public body may charge to the actual cost the public body pays to purchase the recording medium, such as a USB flash drive or CD. Section 6(b) of FOIA details the fee provisions that apply to requests for paper copies of records, such as permitting a public body to charge "its actual cost for reproducing" records that are "in color or in a size other than letter or legal[.]"

    Here, the PAC reviewed the record at issue and recognized that public bodies must incur fiscal obligations to comply with FOIA under section 1. Further, the PAC identified that FOIA restricts public bodies to assessing a fee only for the recording medium such as a Flash drive or CD under section 6(a).  The PAC determined that if the General Assembly had intended to allow a public body to charge fees to reimburse the actual cost it incurred to make redactions to copies of records in electronic format, like video footage, then the General Assembly would have expressly authorized such a fee in section 6(a) of FOIA. The PAC stated that, “[r]equiring a requester to reimburse a public body for expenses such as the cost of using redaction software cannot be reconciled with the plain language of sections 6(a) and 6(b) of FOIA and constitutes a restraint on access to information that contradicts the intent of FOIA.” The PAC found that the Department improperly assessed fees for redactions. The PAC directed the Department to take immediate and appropriate action to comply with the opinion by providing the requester with a copy of the withheld video footage, subject to appropriate redactions, and assessing him a fee of no more than the actual cost of purchasing a recording medium.

    A copy of the decision can be found here.
     
  • General Interest to School Officials
    Termination of High School Teacher for Comments on Facebook Upheld
    Case: Hedgepeth v. Britton (7th Cir. August 26, 2025)
    Decision Date: Tuesday, August 26, 2025
    A school district in Palatine, Illinois, terminated a high school social studies teacher with twenty years of experience following her racially insensitive posts after the police killing of George Floyd on her private Facebook account, which was followed by over 80 percent of former students and community members. Shortly after the teacher made the posts, the school principal began receiving complaints from current high school students, alumni, other teachers, and parents. The school district also received emails, calls, and media inquiries regarding the teacher's social media posts. The controversy that followed disrupted the school’s classroom discussions and summer classes. After investigating the matter and discussing at two school board meetings, the school district fired her, finding that the teacher violated four school district policies, including one that governed teacher conduct on social media and the school's “just and courteous professional relationships” policy, which she had been disciplined for violating twice before. 

    Following her termination by the school district, she filed a civils rights lawsuit claiming she was unlawfully fired in retaliation for exercising her First Amendment right to freedom of speech. The district court denied her request for a preliminary injunction and dismissed her First Amendment claim, finding in favor of the school district on summary judgment, specifically that the school district's interests as a public employer outweighed the teacher’s speech rights under these circumstances. The 7th Circuit (Court) heard the case on appeal.

    In order to succeed in a First Amendment retaliation claim, the teacher had to prove three things: (1) that she engaged in constitutionally protected speech; (2) that she suffered a deprivation likely to deter that protected speech and (3) that the speech was a motivating factor in her termination. The Court analyzed the facts of the case considering the first prong when a public employee “speaks as a citizen addressing a matter of public concern, the First Amendment requires a delicate balancing of the competing interests surrounding the speech and its consequences… [using a] list of seven factors that may be relevant to Pickering balancing:

    (1) whether the speech would create problems in maintaining discipline or harmony among co-workers; (2) whether …the employment relationship is one in which personal loyalty and confidence are necessary; (3) whether the speech impeded the employee's ability to perform her responsibilities; (4) the time, place, and manner of the speech; (5) the context in which the underlying dispute arose; (6) whether the matter was one on which debate was vital to informed decision making; and (7) whether the speaker should be regarded as a member of the general public.” 

    The Court explained that the role of teacher is a position of great public trust and authority, which makes the public employer’s interests even more compelling. The Court emphasized that “[i]n the public education context, the critical focus of each factor is “the effective functioning of the public employer’s enterprise.” (quoting Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987)). “Further, Hedgepeth’s “use of vulgar language” – i.e., jokes about excrement – weakens her speech interests since her role of public trust counsels instead for a “calm, reasoned presentation of her views on [a] sensitive subject” in order to be effective in the classroom and respected in the PHS community. (quoting Darlingh v. Maddaleni, 142 F.4th 558, at 566–67 (7th Cir. 2025)).  The Court noted that while the teacher was speaking on matters of public concern, the school has a legitimate business interest in addressing disruptions at school and giving consideration for possible future operations of the school. The Court disagreed with the teacher's argument that her posts were on her private social media account so that they should not be the basis for her termination; the Court found that her audience of Facebook friends primarily consisted of community members, with 80 percent being former students, and that audience actually amplified her speech.

    The Court upheld the district court’s decision allowing for the termination of the teacher by holding that the teacher’s speech on her private Facebook account fell outside the scope of the First Amendment's protection as applied in the context of public employment.

    A copy of the decision can be found here.
     
  • General Interest to School Officials
    Teacher’s Case Against School District’s Name Policy Remanded
    Case: Kluge v. Brownsburg Community School Corporation, (7th Cir. Aug. 5, 2025)
    Decision Date: Tuesday, August 5, 2025
    The Brownsburg Community School Corporation (District) in Indiana terminated a teacher for his refusal to follow the name policy on use of transgender students’ preferred pronouns. Brownsburg High School (Brownsburg) instituted a policy in 2017 mandating teachers to call students by their first names as they appeared in its database. For transgender students who had changed their first names, the database listed their new ones. John Kluge was a teacher at Brownsburg. He repeatedly objected to the school’s name policy on religious grounds. Kluge believed that calling transgender students names that conflicted with their biological sex encouraged their transgender identities which he considers a sin. He requested a religious accommodation, which was granted. Kluge was allowed to call students by only their last names. This lasted for about one school year, then the accommodation was rescinded. Kluge was told to either call the students by their first names as they appear in the school’s database or face termination. He attempted to work with the school and negotiate, but ultimately his resignation was accepted by the school board. He sued the District under Title VII for failing to accommodate his religion and retaliation.

    An employer is required to accommodate an employee’s religious practices unless doing so would impose an “undue hardship” on its business. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). At issue in this case is whether the impacts caused by Brownsburg’s accommodation of Kluge rise to the level of an undue hardship for the school under the new standard set in Groff v. DeJoy, 600 U.S. 447 (2023). The Seventh Circuit Court found that because material factual disputes exist, the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Brownsburg on Kluge’s accommodation claim was reversed and the case is being remanded for further proceedings.

    Key takeaways from the case include that the Seventh Circuit found that facts were needed to determine the undue hardship question and summary judgment was not appropriate. The Seventh Circuit found that the district court should not have defined Brownsburg’s mission. Brownsburg is required on remand of the case to offer proof of its mission pre-dating Kluge’s request for accommodation. The Seventh Circuit, applying the higher standard of Groff to Brownsburg’s argument of undue hardship caused by accommodating Kluge’s religious beliefs, said Brownsburg had not produced undisputed facts demonstrating an “excessive” or “unjustifiable” hardship on its mission of “fostering a safe, inclusive learning environment for all.”

    The Seventh Circuit found that whether the accommodation caused harm is unclear at this point and spent time explaining that evidence is needed to show whether the act of using last names in isolation caused objective, not subjective harm.  There was conflicting evidence on the sincerity of Kluge’s asserted religious beliefs due to the fact that Kluge used the first and last names of all students as they appear in the database during an awards ceremony for the orchestra. This was the only occasion on which he referred to transgender students by their chosen first names. Kluge explained he felt it would be “unreasonable and conspicuous” to refer to students by their last names at such a “formal event,” as opposed to the classroom setting. He acknowledged that using the transgender students’ chosen first names was “sinful” to him, yet he thought he was “making a good-faith effort to work within the bounds of” his last-name-only accommodation. Brownsburg argued that Kluge’s ability to use the names as they appeared in the database is evidence of his lack of sincerely held religious beliefs. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Kluge’s summary judgment motion on this question of sincerely held religious belief and held that a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding Kluge’s sincerity. 

    As a second basis for undue hardship, Brownsburg presented that the last-name-only accommodation exposed it to an unreasonable risk of Title IX liability. It cited Seventh Circuit precedent for the proposition that schools are subject to liability any time they “treat[] transgender students differently than other students.” By contrast, Kluge asserted that by adhering to the last name-only practice, he “treated everyone the same,” so any liability was at most speculative. The Seventh Circuit found that Kluge, by adhering to the last-name-only practice, was not definitely treating transgender students worse than their classmates, or subjecting them to “increased stigmatization” and there remained questions of fact. Brownsburg did not show undisputed evidence that the accommodation placed the school on the “razor’s edge of legal liability,” under Title IX.  

    Overall, the district court’s decision to not revisit Kluge’s retaliation claim was affirmed based on a waiver by Kluge of the argument. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of summary judgment to Kluge based on factual disputes as to the sincerity of his religious beliefs. Because other factual disputes were found to exist on the undue hardship issue, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Brownsburg as to the undue hardship caused by the accommodation and remanded the case for further proceedings on that topic consistent with the opinion. The Seventh Circuit granted the district court the discretion to decide whether to reopen discovery on remand.

    A copy of the decision can be found here.