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Recent Court Decisions

Recent court and agency decisions involving board work

IASB's Office of General Counsel prepares summaries chosen from the Illinois Supreme and Appellate courts, federal court, agencies, the Illinois Public Access Counselor, and other tribunals issuing interesting decisions. Information in the summaries is limited to a brief synopsis and is not intended for purposes of legal advice. For the complete text of any case cited in this section, go to the Illinois state courts, Illinois Attorney General, or Federal courts finder links.

To search by the names of the plaintiff or defendant or other keyword, use the site search box located at the top of this website. Then filter results by Court Decision.

Questions regarding Recent Court and Agency Decisions should be directed to Maryam Brotine, ext. 1219, or by mbrotine@iasb.com.

Court decisions are listed in order of the date posted, with the most recent shown first.
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  • General Interest to School Officials
    Illinois Supreme Court Upholds Village's Prosecution of Cannabis DUI For High School Driver’s Education Student
    Case: Village of Lincolnshire v. Olvera
    Decision Date: Thursday, May 22, 2025

    The Illinois Supreme Court upheld the conviction of a 16-year-old Stevenson High School student for driving under the influence (DUI) during a driver’s education class.
    The Village of Lincolnshire (Village) brought state DUI charges against the student, who was later found guilty in a bench trial. The student appealed and his case made its way to the Illinois Supreme Court, where he argued that the Village lacked authority to prosecute the DUI, and that the evidence was insufficient to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of DUI.
     

    First, the student claimed that the Village lacked authority to prosecute the DUI because it failed to present written permission from the State authorizing the Village to prosecute the case under state statute. The parties agreed that the Village did have such written permission in this case. The statute at issue does not require the Village to submit its written permission into the record. Both the Appellate Court and the Illinois Supreme Court rejected the arguments presented, and held that the statute does not require the Village to submit written authority into the record at trial.
     

    Second, the student argued that the Village failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was under the influence of cannabis, and that it was to a degree that “rendered him incapable of safely driving.” In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the  court must determine whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found the required elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
     

    The Illinois Supreme Court noted that at trial, the Village presented testimony from the driver’s education teacher, who observed many concerns with the student’s driving that day. The student did not look over his shoulder or check the car’s rearview mirror when backing out. While driving, the student veered into the outside lane as he turned left into the inside lane, causing the teacher to grab the wheel to avoid a car approaching on the right, and the student continued veering left and right as he drove down the road. The teacher grabbed the wheel several times to put the student back into the proper lane. As the student approached a stop sign, the teacher had to use the brake on his side of the car to stop the vehicle because defendant “wasn’t going to come to a complete stop,” and again had to use the brake when the student approached a stoplight. After the drive, the Dean assigned to the student was called. The Dean spoke with defendant and testified that his speech was slow, he was confused, and he could not respond quickly to questioning. The Dean was concerned and walked the student to the nurse’s office thinking the student needed to be checked out medically. Afterwards, the Dean interviewed the student, who told her that he had been up all night because he had been using marijuana in the evening and that his mother caught him.
     

    Given the admission about using marijuana, the Dean called another dean of students at the high school, and asked for a student search of defendant. That other dean searched the student and found a skinny, white, rolled object in the student’s wallet. The student said that it was a marijuana cigarette.  The Dean then called a Village police officer who was employed by the high school as a school resource officer. The resource officer conducted a balance assessment on the student, who kept falling over, losing his balance and catching himself with his other foot or his hand. After failing the field sobriety tests, the officer informed the student that he would be arrested. Additional evidence was submitted into the record of surveillance footage from the high school showing the student stumbling through the school hallways before exiting to the driver’s education vehicle. In addition, field sobriety tests were conducted in the booking room at the police station. Those tests were video recorded, admitted into evidence, and played for the trial court. That police officer also determined that the student was under the influence. The trial court found defendant guilty of DUI (cannabis).
     

    When viewing all evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the evidence supported a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the student was under influence of cannabis and was incapable of safely driving, upholding his conviction.
     

    A copy of the case is available here.
     

  • General Interest to School Officials
    School Employee’s First Amendment Claim to Proceed to Trial
    Case: Caparelli-Ruff v. Board of Education of East Aurora School District 131 et al.
    Decision Date: Wednesday, April 16, 2025

    In April 2025, the Federal District Court for the Northern District of Illinois (District Court) issued an opinion allowing a school employee’s First Amendment retaliation claim to proceed to trial. In the case, the Executive Director of Student Services (Director) of a school district (School District) was employed by the School District under a one-year contract for the 2021-2022 school year. During the spring of 2022, the Director began a campaign for County Regional Superintendent of Schools, which is a political position unrelated to her employment with the School District. The Director held a gun raffle to raise campaign contributions in May 2022 shortly after the Uvalde, Texas school shooting. She advertised the gun raffle on her personal Facebook page. Within weeks of posting the advertisement, the Director was placed on paid administrative leave by the School District for the remaining term of her employment contract.
     

    The Director filed a lawsuit against the School District, claiming she was terminated and her contract was not renewed in retaliation for her post about the gun raffle. The Director argued that the School District’s actions constituted a breach of her employment contract and that they violated her First Amendment right to free speech. The School District defended its decision because of her poor performance, which was contested.
     

    The Court went through a balancing test to evaluate the First Amendment violation claim specifically whether the Director’s interest in speaking as a private citizen outweighed the School District’s interest in maintaining orderly operations. First, the Court found that the raffle advertisement was posted in the Director’s personal capacity, since it related to her campaign for public office that was separate from her employment. Second, in evaluating whether the Director’s post interfered with the School District’s operations, the District Court considered the actual impact of her post on the school community based on several factors, including whether the post disrupted harmony among co-workers, whether the post interfered with the Director’s job duties, and the context of the post.
     

    The School District argued that the advertisement was very disruptive, since it was posted around the same time of the school shooting in Uvalde, Texas, and staff had raised concerns about the Director’s judgment in advertising a gun raffle at that time. The Director argued that the School District had misconstrued the post because the post was made to her personal Facebook page, and she had not discussed the raffle while at work. Further, she argued her campaign did not impact her ability to do her job as Director.
     

    Taking all the factors into consideration, the District Court found that the School District failed to show that the post unduly interfered with its operations or the Director’s performance of her duties. Because the School District had not shown that its interests outweighed those of the Director in speaking freely, it did not meet its burden for summary judgment. The District Court ruled in favor of the School District on the breach of contract claims. The District Court denied the School District's motion for summary judgment on the Director’s First Amendment retaliation claim and determined that the claim could move forward to trial.
     

    This is a copy of the decision.

  • Open Meetings Act - OMA
    Whether a Leadership Team is A Public Body Subject to OMA
    Case: Non-Binding Opinion – 2019 PAC 58582
    Decision Date: Monday, December 16, 2024
    This non-binding opinion from the Illinois Attorney General’s Public Access Counselor (PAC) discusses an issue under the Open Meetings Act (OMA) of whether the Evanston/Skokie School District No. 65 (School) Board of Trustees (Board) Leadership team, consisting of the Board President and Vice President, was a “public body” subject to the requirements of OMA due to its function and membership.

    Section 1 of OMA states that "it is the intent of this Act to ensure that the actions of public bodies be taken openly and that their deliberations be conducted openly." Section 1.02 of the OMA defines "public body" as including "all legislative, executive, administrative or advisory bodies of the State, counties, townships, cities, villages, incorporated towns, school districts and all other municipal corporations, boards, bureaus, committees or commissions of this State, and any subsidiary bodies of any of the foregoing including but limited to committees and subcommittees[.]" Generally, the OMA applies to a majority of a quorum of school board members when discussing public business contemporaneously, commonly three or more school board members. In analyzing whether an entity constitutes an advisory body of a public body, Illinois courts have examined: (1) who appoints the members of the entity, (2) the formality of their appointment, (3) whether the members are paid for their tenure, (4) the entity's assigned duties, including duties reflected in its bylaws or authorizing statute, (5) whether the entity's role is solely advisory or whether it also has a deliberative or investigative function, (6) whether the entity is subject to government control or otherwise accountable to any public body, (7) whether the entity has a budget, (8) the entity's place within the larger public body, and (9) the impact of decisions or recommendations that the entity makes. University Professionals of Illinois v. Stukel, 344 Ill. App. 3d 856, 865 (2003). Courts have considered four primary factors in determining whether an entity is a "subsidiary body" of a public body: (1) the extent to which the entity has a legal existence independent of government resolution, (2) the degree of government control exerted over the entity, (3) the extent to which the entity is publicly funded, and (4) the nature of the functions performed by the entity." Better Government Ass'n v. Illinois High School Ass'n, 2017 IL 121124, ¶ 26.

    Here, an individual filed a request for review with the PAC claiming the Leadership Team was working together as a separate group of two persons for a common purpose and were acting together as a subsidiary body and as a committee of the School Board. With only two members of the Leadership Team, the Board President and Vice President, the question was whether the group was a committee of the Board. The PAC analyzed the facts under Stukel and found that the Leadership Team appeared to be an internal group formed at the discretion of the Board President and Vice President to enhance discussions amongst the Board, administration, and the teachers' union in an informal manner rather than to make decisions or issue formal recommendations with binding or significant impact. The PAC distinguished that although the Leadership Team provided input from those discussions to the Board, the Board would make the final determination on any Board or District matters. The PAC further noted that the Leadership Team did not have any bylaws or an authorizing statute and had no formal deliberative or investigative functions. Further, the PAC found that there was no indication that the Board exercised control over the Leadership Team. The PAC found most important that the Leadership Team was not a part of the formal structure of the Board, nor was it created by the Board as a public body. In analyzing whether the Leadership team was a subsidiary of the School Board, the PAC found that the Board did not take action to integrate the Leadership Team into its formal structure or recognize it as a committee.

    The PAC concluded that because the Leadership Team lacked the key features of an advisory body, committee, or subsidiary body, the Leadership Team is not a "public body" subject to the requirements of OMA. The PAC determined that the resolution of this matter did not require the issuance of a binding opinion and the matter is closed. 
     
  • Open Meetings Act - OMA
    Notice of a Change in Regular Meeting Dates
    Case: Public Access Opinion 24-013
    Decision Date: Friday, October 25, 2024
    This binding opinion from the Illinois Attorney General’s Public Access Counselor (PAC) discusses an issue under the Open Meetings Act (OMA) of whether there was a violation by the Village of Marissa (Village) Board of Trustees (Board) of the duty to give notice of a change in regular meeting dates.

    Under OMA, it is "the public policy of this State that its citizens shall be given advance notice of and the right to attend all meetings at which any business of a public body is discussed or acted upon in any way." 5 ILCS 120/1. Public notice of all meetings, whether open or closed to the public, shall be given as follows: (a) Every public body shall give public notice of the schedule of regular meetings at the beginning of each calendar or fiscal year and shall state the regular dates, times, and places of such meetings. 5 ILCS 120/2.02. If a change is made in regular meeting dates, at least 10 days' notice of such change shall be given by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the area in which such body functions. However, in the case of bodies of local governmental units with a population of less than 500 in which no newspaper is published, such 10 days' notice may be given by posting a notice of such change in at least three prominent places within the governmental unit. Notice of such change shall also be posted at the principal office of the public body or, if no such office exists, at the building in which the meeting is to be held. Notice of such change shall also be supplied to those news media which have filed an annual request for notice as provided in paragraph (b) of Section 2.02. 5 ILCS 120/2.03.

    Here, an individual filed a request for review with the PAC claiming the Village Board failed to comply with the OMA when it voted to move its regular meetings from the third Monday of each month to the third Wednesday of each month. The individual claimed the Village did not publish notice of this change to its regular meeting schedule 10 days prior to taking action on the change, as required by section 2.03.The PAC analyzed the difference between (1) a change in a single regular meeting date that would be subject to the rescheduled or special meeting notice requirements of posting 48 hours in advance and (2) a change to a public body's regular meeting dates which requires 10 days prior notice by publication in a newspaper and posting notice at the principal office of the public body. The PAC determined that the Board did not give at least 10 days' notice of the changed regular meeting dates before the July 17, 2024 meeting. A County Journal news article written about the schedule change does not constitute notice by publication in a newspaper as required by section 2.03 of OMA. The PAC found that the Board violated section 2.03 of OMA, however the PAC acknowledged that no further action is necessary to remedy the violation because the Village Board subsequently published a legal notice of its change to its regular meeting schedule.

    This opinion is binding only to the parties involved and may be appealed pursuant to State law. The complete Public Access Opinion 24-013 can be found here.
     
  • Freedom of Information Act - FOIA
    Redacted Disclosure of Educational Records
    Case: Better Gov't Ass'n v. City Colleges of Chicago (2024 IL App (1st) 221414)
    Decision Date: Thursday, September 19, 2024
    Plaintiff Better Government Association (BGA) requested education records under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) from defendant City Colleges of Chicago (City Colleges). City Colleges withheld and redacted responsive records. The BGA sued City Colleges alleging its response violated FOIA. The circuit court ruled in favor of BGA, finding that the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) did not “specifically prohibit” the disclosure of the requested records and ordered City Colleges to disclose the records. City Colleges appealed, and the appellate court (Court) ruled in favor of City Colleges.

    This was a case of first impression in Illinois regarding the intersection of FOIA and FERPA.  Section 7 of FOIA exempts information from disclosure when it is “specifically prohibited from disclosure by federal or state laws or rules and regulations implementing federal or State law.” 5 ILCS 140/7(1)(a). FERPA is a federal law that provides that “no funds shall be made available under any applicable program to any educational agency or institution which has a policy or practice of permitting the release of education records (or personally identifiable information contained therein other than directory information)…of students without the written consent of their parents to any individual, agency, or organization.” 20 U.S.C. §1232g(b)(1).

    The Court reviewed BGA’s request for “[d]ata regarding completed course work and curriculum for each of the graduates in the cohort counted toward the 2018 graduation rate…each course completed, the date of completion, credit hours earned, grade and degree.” City Colleges had redacted and withheld certain information from the requested records pursuant to section 7 of FOIA because of FERPA. City Colleges argued that the redacted information contained personally identifiable information, which could not be released without written consent from the students or their parents/guardians and that the records, even with student identities removed, would still contain “indirect identifiers” that could be used to identify students in violation of FERPA. BGA argued that City Colleges failed to meet its burden to prove that withheld information was exempted by statute because City Colleges cited to FERPA generally and made only conclusory statements that data could be used to indirectly identify students. 

    The Court found that the circuit court erred in determining there were no questions of fact, and it did not address the issue of the “de-identified” records, but instead it determined erroneously that FERPA is a funding statute that does not specifically prohibit the disclosure of student education data. 

    The Court determined that the central question was whether FERPA “specifically prohibits,” as that phrase is used in section 7 of FOIA, the release of the education records BGA sought in its FOIA request, such that the records are exempt from disclosure. The Court found that “the exemption in section 7(1)(a) of FOIA operates to exempt the requested records from disclosure in this case.” It noted that even courts that have found that FERPA does not “specifically prohibit” the release of education records have nonetheless recognized that FERPA was intended to protect records that contain personally identifiable information. 

    The Court stated that “FERPA does not prohibit the release of all education records in all circumstances. However, it does prohibit the release of personally identifiable information in education records without the consent of the students or their guardians.” The Court found that under FERPA and FOIA, public access to education records that contain personally identifiable information of a student “was not intended.”

    Based on this finding, the Court stated that it was not clear, due to the lack of a record, what personally identifiable information is present in the requested records, whether the records can be redacted in a manner to satisfy FERPA and FOIA, and whether the redacted records would be responsive to BGA’s FOIA request. The Court remanded the case back to the circuit court to: 1) review the materials responsive to BGA’s FOIA request, and 2) redact or otherwise separate any portion of the education records that might contain information that constitutes “personally identifiable information” protected by FERPA.

    Here is a copy of the full case.