Recent Court Decisions

The Brownsburg Community School Corporation (District) in Indiana terminated a teacher for his refusal to follow the name policy on use of transgender students’ preferred pronouns. Brownsburg High School (Brownsburg) instituted a policy in 2017 mandating teachers to call students by their first names as they appeared in its database. For transgender students who had changed their first names, the database listed their new ones. John Kluge was a teacher at Brownsburg. He repeatedly objected to the school’s name policy on religious grounds. Kluge believed that calling transgender students names that conflicted with their biological sex encouraged their transgender identities which he considers a sin. He requested a religious accommodation, which was granted. Kluge was allowed to call students by only their last names. This lasted for about one school year, then the accommodation was rescinded. Kluge was told to either call the students by their first names as they appear in the school’s database or face termination. He attempted to work with the school and negotiate, but ultimately his resignation was accepted by the school board. He sued the District under Title VII for failing to accommodate his religion and retaliation.

An employer is required to accommodate an employee’s religious practices unless doing so would impose an “undue hardship” on its business. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). At issue in this case is whether the impacts caused by Brownsburg’s accommodation of Kluge rise to the level of an undue hardship for the school under the new standard set in Groff v. DeJoy, 600 U.S. 447 (2023). The Seventh Circuit Court found that because material factual disputes exist, the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Brownsburg on Kluge’s accommodation claim was reversed and the case is being remanded for further proceedings.

Key takeaways from the case include that the Seventh Circuit found that facts were needed to determine the undue hardship question and summary judgment was not appropriate. The Seventh Circuit found that the district court should not have defined Brownsburg’s mission. Brownsburg is required on remand of the case to offer proof of its mission pre-dating Kluge’s request for accommodation. The Seventh Circuit, applying the higher standard of Groff to Brownsburg’s argument of undue hardship caused by accommodating Kluge’s religious beliefs, said Brownsburg had not produced undisputed facts demonstrating an “excessive” or “unjustifiable” hardship on its mission of “fostering a safe, inclusive learning environment for all.”

The Seventh Circuit found that whether the accommodation caused harm is unclear at this point and spent time explaining that evidence is needed to show whether the act of using last names in isolation caused objective, not subjective harm.  There was conflicting evidence on the sincerity of Kluge’s asserted religious beliefs due to the fact that Kluge used the first and last names of all students as they appear in the database during an awards ceremony for the orchestra. This was the only occasion on which he referred to transgender students by their chosen first names. Kluge explained he felt it would be “unreasonable and conspicuous” to refer to students by their last names at such a “formal event,” as opposed to the classroom setting. He acknowledged that using the transgender students’ chosen first names was “sinful” to him, yet he thought he was “making a good-faith effort to work within the bounds of” his last-name-only accommodation. Brownsburg argued that Kluge’s ability to use the names as they appeared in the database is evidence of his lack of sincerely held religious beliefs. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Kluge’s summary judgment motion on this question of sincerely held religious belief and held that a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding Kluge’s sincerity. 

As a second basis for undue hardship, Brownsburg presented that the last-name-only accommodation exposed it to an unreasonable risk of Title IX liability. It cited Seventh Circuit precedent for the proposition that schools are subject to liability any time they “treat[] transgender students differently than other students.” By contrast, Kluge asserted that by adhering to the last name-only practice, he “treated everyone the same,” so any liability was at most speculative. The Seventh Circuit found that Kluge, by adhering to the last-name-only practice, was not definitely treating transgender students worse than their classmates, or subjecting them to “increased stigmatization” and there remained questions of fact. Brownsburg did not show undisputed evidence that the accommodation placed the school on the “razor’s edge of legal liability,” under Title IX.  

Overall, the district court’s decision to not revisit Kluge’s retaliation claim was affirmed based on a waiver by Kluge of the argument. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of summary judgment to Kluge based on factual disputes as to the sincerity of his religious beliefs. Because other factual disputes were found to exist on the undue hardship issue, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Brownsburg as to the undue hardship caused by the accommodation and remanded the case for further proceedings on that topic consistent with the opinion. The Seventh Circuit granted the district court the discretion to decide whether to reopen discovery on remand.

A copy of the decision can be found here.
 

A school district in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, terminated a school counselor following her profanity-laden speech against transgenderism given at a rally at the State Capitol.  Following her termination by the school district, she filed a civils rights lawsuit claiming she was unlawfully fired in retaliation for exercising her First Amendment right to freedom of speech. The district court denied her request for a preliminary injunction and dismissed her First Amendment claim, finding in favor of the school district, specifically that the school district's interests as a public employer outweighed her speech rights under these circumstances. The 7th Circuit upheld the district court’s decision holding that her speech fell outside the scope of the First Amendment's protection as applied in the context of public employment.

The Court analyzed the facts of the case considering when a public employee “speaks as a citizen addressing a matter of public concern, the First Amendment requires a delicate balancing of the competing interests surrounding the speech and its consequences… [using a] list of seven factors that may be relevant to Pickering balancing:

(1) whether the speech would create problems in maintaining discipline or harmony among co-workers; (2) whether …the employment relationship is one in which personal loyalty and confidence are necessary; (3) whether the speech impeded the employee's ability to perform her responsibilities; (4) the time, place, and manner of the speech; (5) the context in which the underlying dispute arose; (6) whether the matter was one on which debate was vital to informed decision making; and (7) whether the speaker should be regarded as a member of the general public.” 

The 7th Circuit (Court) took note of the fact that she introduced herself to the crowd as a school counselor for the Milwaukee public school district. The Court explained that the role of teacher and school counselor are positions of great public trust and authority. “These positions by their nature require “a degree of public trust not found in many other positions of public employment.” The Court found that the school counselor’s “speech was fundamentally at odds with this foundational duty. It was not a calm, reasoned presentation of her views on this sensitive subject. She made a harsh, angry, and profanity-filled public pledge to carry out her counseling duties in a relentlessly rigid way when it comes to transgender issues. That pledge was hardly compatible with her obligation to build student and parental trust when counseling children with gender dysphoria or who otherwise struggle with gender-identity concerns. Nor is it compatible with her responsibility as a school counselor to promote respect for and humane treatment of these children by other students. Darlingh vowed that “not a single one” of her students would “ever, ever transition” on her watch, punctuating her promise with multiple expletives. In this way she signaled to students and parents an inability to deal with this sensitive subject with equanimity, civility, and respect for different views. Her speech is hard to reconcile with her professional obligation to approach her counseling duties with empathy and good judgment.” The termination letter she received explained that her speech impaired her ability to perform her role as a school counselor, damaged the district's reputation, and undermined its mission to provide an equitable and supportive learning environment for all students. 

The court determined that the Pickering balance tipped in favor of the school district mainly because of “…the speech itself, the sensitive nature of Darlingh's job, and the school district's reasonable assessment that her profanity-ridden remarks expressed a fixed commitment to carry out her duties in a way that conflicted with its mission and policies, to the detriment of the district, students, and parents.” 

A copy of the decision can be found here.
 

A member of the public submitted a request for review to the Illinois Attorney General's Public Access Counselor's office (PAC) alleging that a City of Peru (City) pool committee (Committee) violated the Open Meetings Act (OMA) by holding meetings closed to the public regarding building a new pool in the City. The PAC analyzed the issue presented using a four-factor test established by the Illinois Supreme Court to determine whether the Committee would constitute a “subsidiary body” subject to OMA requirements.

Section 1 of OMA states that "it is the intent of this Act to ensure that the actions of public bodies be taken openly and that their deliberations be conducted openly." Section 1.02 of the OMA defines "public body" as including "all legislative, executive, administrative or advisory bodies of the State, counties, townships, cities, villages, incorporated towns, school districts and all other municipal corporations, boards, bureaus, committees or commissions of this State, and any subsidiary bodies of any of the foregoing including but limited to committees and subcommittees[.]" Generally, the OMA applies to a majority of a quorum of school board members when discussing public business contemporaneously, commonly three or more school board members. In analyzing whether an entity constitutes an advisory body of a public body, Illinois courts have examined: (1) who appoints the members of the entity, (2) the formality of their appointment, (3) whether the members are paid for their tenure, (4) the entity's assigned duties, including duties reflected in its bylaws or authorizing statute, (5) whether the entity's role is solely advisory or whether it also has a deliberative or investigative function, (6) whether the entity is subject to government control or otherwise accountable to any public body, (7) whether the entity has a budget, (8) the entity's place within the larger public body, and (9) the impact of decisions or recommendations that the entity makes. University Professionals of Illinois v. Stukel, 344 Ill. App. 3d 856, 865 (2003). Courts have considered four primary factors in determining whether an entity is a "subsidiary body" of a public body: (1) the extent to which the entity has a legal existence independent of government resolution, (2) the degree of government control exerted over the entity, (3) the extent to which the entity is publicly funded, and (4) the nature of the functions performed by the entity." Better Government Ass'n v. Illinois High School Ass'n, 2017 IL 121124, ¶ 26.

First, the PAC found that the City created the Committee as part of the City’s planning process to construct a new pool in the City. The City claimed the Committee was an informal advisory committee doing preliminary background work for the City to consider. The PAC stated that even if the City labels the Committee or its gatherings as “informal” that does not shield the gatherings or discussions about public business from OMA requirements. The PAC determined that the Committee would not legally exist independently of the City.

Second, the PAC found that the Mayor appointed the members of the Committee, the Committee’s recommendations were all subject to City Council review and approval, and the City had been directly involved in and controlled most of the Committee activities relating to building a pool in the City, including providing assistance related to finance, engineering and zoning, and parks and recreations matters. The PAC determined that the City exerts a significant amount of government control over the Committee.

Third, the PAC found that even though the City claimed that the members of the committee are volunteering, the Committee received at least some indirect public funding by virtue of being part of the City, and salaried City officials and employees devoted their time to supporting the Committee’s activities. For example, the Mayor appointed to the Committee two members of the City Council as well as the City's Director of Parks, Recreation and Special Events.

Finally, the PAC found that the Committee was tasked with assessing the potential designs, costs, and locations for a new City pool, and reporting its findings to the City, which are roles typically performed by a municipal committee. The PAC determined that the City utilized the Committee to perform governmental functions.

The PAC concluded that the Committee is a subsidiary body of the City subject to the requirements of OMA.

A copy of the decision can be found here.

This binding opinion from the Illinois Attorney General’s Public Access Counselor (PAC) discusses an issue under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) of whether the City of Chicago (City) Department of Finance (Department) improperly withheld a record responsive to a FOIA request for settlement-related records.

It is the public policy of the State of Illinois that "all persons are entitled to full and complete information regarding the affairs of government." 5 ILCS 140/1. Under FOIA, "(a]ll records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be open to inspection or copying. Any public body that asserts that a record is exempt from disclosure has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that it is exempt." 5 ILCS 140/1.2. Section 7(1)(m) of FOIA exempts from disclosure: “Communications between a public body and an attorney or auditor representing the public body that would not be subject to discovery in litigation, and materials prepared or compiled by or for a public body in anticipation of a criminal, civil or administrative proceeding upon the request of an attorney advising the public body, and materials prepared or compiled with respect to internal audits of public bodies. A party asserting that a communication to an attorney is protected by the attorney-client privilege must show that "(1) a statement originated in confidence that it would not be disclosed; (2) it was made to an attorney acting in his legal capacity for the purpose of securing legal advice or services; and (3) it remained confidential." Cangelosi v. Capasso, 366 Ill. App. 3d 225, 228 (2006). A public body that withholds records under section 7(1)(m) "can meet its burden only by providing some objective indicia that the exemption is applicable under the circumstances." Illinois Education Ass'n v. Illinois State Board of Education, 204 Ill. 2d 456, 470 (2003).

Here, the PAC reviewed the settlement record at issue and was unable to find an indication that legal advice was sought or provided or that the City attorney who signed the record was acting as the Alderman's attorney in connection with the settlement. The City had been dismissed from the case and the Alderman was represented by private counsel. Although part of the record briefly explains the City's involvement in the settlement, neither that statement nor any other portion of the record renders legal advice to the Alderman or indicates that the Alderman sought legal advice pertaining to the litigation and settlement from the City attorney. Rather, the withheld record is a document concerning the settlement which is signed by the Alderman and an attorney with the City's Law Department. The City attorney was representing the City while the Alderman had his own attorney, and the parties had separate interests in the subject that the withheld record addresses.

In addition, the PAC cited to the Illinois Constitution at Article VIII, section 1(c), which provides that "[r]eports and records of the obligation, receipt and use of public funds of the State, units of local government and school districts are public records available for inspection by the public according to law." The constitutional right to information regarding the use of public funds is incorporated into the provisions of FOIA. 5 ILCS 140/2.5. ("All records relating to the obligation, receipt, and use of public funds of the State, units of local government, and school districts are public records subject to inspection and copying by the public.").

The PAC concluded that the public has a constitutional right to know the purposes for which public funds are expended. Because the withheld settlement record relates to such a purpose and because it is not a communication protected by the attorney-client privilege, the Department did not sustain its burden of proving that the record is exempt from disclosure under section 7(1)(m) of FOIA.

A copy of the decision can be found here.
 

In a 6-3 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the FCC’s E-rate program, which supports internet access for schools and millions of students across the country.  Consumers’ Research, an advocacy group, challenged the constitutionality of the funding mechanism for the E-rate program. The group claimed, in part, that Congress had improperly delegated its taxing power because the FCC uses a private entity, the Universal Service Administrative Co., to recommend contribution rates and collect fees that fund the program. The Court found that the FCC was properly exercising its authority to implement the E-rate law, which directs the FCC to collect contributions that are “sufficient” to support the program.