Recent Court Decisions

Local newspapers asked the Jo Daviess County Board to produce tapes of two closed meetings discussing real estate with the City Council of Galena and the Jo Daviess County Planning and Development Committee; the County Board refused. The newspapers filed a lawsuit seeking publication of the tapes and minutes claiming certain peripheral discussions about a lease during the closed meetings were not exempt from disclosure under the Open Meetings Act. On July 18, 2007, the Second District Appellate Court reversed and the Jo Daviess circuit court and ruled that no distinction for purposes of exemption from Open Meetings Act exists between the discussions concerning the “material terms of the lease” and the “peripheral matters such as how the lessee would utilize the space rented”. The court asserted that nothing in the Open Meetings Act draws a distinction between “material” matters and “peripheral” ones and creating such a distinction between them would be “exceedingly difficult to apply” because the line between “material” and “peripheral” terms “is bound to be either arbitrary or vague.” Therefore, the Second District held that the Open Meetings Act applies to tapes and minutes of the entirety of an executive/closed session - even to topics that may be peripheral and could be redacted.

A former employee sued school board members alleging that two of their closed board meetings violated the Open Meetings Act. In the first meeting, the school board voted to go into closed session “to discuss an employee matter, specifically the reclassification of employment” without giving a statutory citation. The court found that the Act does not require a statutory citation; it requires “a citation to the specific exception contained in” the Act. Said the court: “By referring to an ‘employee matter’ and ‘reclassification of employment,’ defendants adequately identified the exception in section 2(c)(1). An additional citation to the statutory subsection might have been helpful but was not required. Citing the exception was sufficient.”

The second meeting being scrutinized violated the Open Meetings Act because the reason given for going into closed session – “litigation” – was not supported by required information. Said the court: “The ‘litigation’ exception is a forked path. If the litigation has been filed and is pending, the public body need only announce that in the proposed closed meeting, it will discuss litigation that has been filed and is pending. If the litigation has not yet been filed, the public body must (1) find that the litigation is probable or imminent and (2) record and enter into the minutes the basis for that finding. Evidently, the legislature intended to prevent public bodies from using the distant possibility of litigation as a pretext for closing their meetings to the public.” The court remanded the case to the trial court for a remedy determination.

Taxpayers brought actions against school district employees, the district’s accountant, and district school board members (collectively “defendants”). They alleged the defendants engaged in or permitted improper spending of money from the district’s working cash fund and they sought to (a) recover the money and (b) impose criminal penalties, including an order requiring the board members to forfeit their offices.

The court found that:

(a) The taxpayers could not recover a monetary award from the defendants because the taxpayers did not allege that the money transferred from the working cash fund was put toward an improper purpose forbidden by law. All monies were spent on legitimate school expenses, and the school board eventually effected a permanent transfer of the money by passing resolutions to abate and/or abolish the working cash fund.

(b) The taxpayers are not authorized under the law to seek criminal penalties or forfeiture of office (only the State of Illinois may impose such penalties under this law). The law does not authorize a civil suit to recover vast sums of money personally from district defendants for the alleged violation of the working cash provisions of the law when there are no allegations of monies being used for anything other than legitimate school expenditures.

The following case is from Ohio. It is not binding in Illinois. However, its facts and the ruling may be of interest to school officials. See the General Area “Public Access Counselor Opinions” for more information on the Illinois Open Meetings Act.

Patricia Paridon, among others, filed a complaint on October 20, 2011 for an injunction on the Trumbull County Children’s Services Board’s (“the board”) sign-in policy for public meetings. An injunction is a court order requiring a party to do something or to stop a party from doing something. Paridon asked the court to stop the board from enforcing its sign-in policy. The complaint alleged that on October 18, 2011, Paridon was not allowed to enter a public meeting of the board because she refused to sign a sign-in sheet in accordance with the board’s sign-in policy. Furthermore, the complaint alleged that this policy violated Ohio’s Sunshine Law. The trial court denied Paridon’s request for an injunction and she appealed the trial court’s judgment to the Court of Appeals.

The purpose of the board’s policy is to protect children that are within the board’s care and live at the board’s facility. The policy is also intended to protect the confidential records located within the facility. This facility is also where the public meetings are held. After a member of the public signs their name to the sign-in sheet, they are permitted to enter the meeting. The board does not verify the names of the individuals who have signed-in nor do they perform a background check.

Paridon made several arguments against the board’s policy. Among these arguments, Paridon stated that the Ohio’s Sunshine Law provided individuals with an absolute right to be present at public meetings. The court disagreed with this argument and stated that Ohio’s Sunshine Law does not preclude a public agency from instituting a policy requiring individuals to sign-in prior to admission to a public meeting. Paridon also argued that the board has not consistently required members of the public to sign-in prior to admission to a public meeting. However, the court stated that there was no evidence prior to this instance in which the board did not maintain a sign-in policy. Paridon then argued that Ohio’s Sunshine Law does not contain a sign-in requirement for public meeting and therefore, the board cannot implement one. The court disagreed with this argument as well, stating that the board may place access restrictions on their public meetings so long as these restrictions are content-neutral and narrowly tailored to serve a significant interest.

The court disagreed with all of Paridon’s remaining arguments. The court stated that the board’s sign-policy was content-neutral and narrowly tailored to assist in the board’s goal of protecting the children and the board’s confidential records. The court also stated that the sign-in policy was not intrusive into the lives of those wishing to attend the public meeting because it merely required a prospective attendee to sign his or her name to a sheet of paper. Furthermore, the policy did not prohibit individuals from attending the meeting. Rather, they had a choice to either sign their name or not. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling denying Paridon’s request for an injunction.

Melissa-Ann E. Evanchik, IASB Law Clerk

This case originates from a state “quo warranto” action to remove General Parker’s name from the school board ballot for a prior felony conviction. See People ex rel. Lyons v. Parker, 2012 IL App (3d) 110140-U, (Order filed 5/8/2012), summarized directly below and available here:

http://www.state.il.us/court/R23_Orders/AppellateCourt/2012/3rdDistrict/3110140_R23.pdf.

A quo warranto action is used to challenge another’s right to public office. In the 2012 case, the State’s Attorney successfully obtained an order barring General Parker from running for the local school board. General Parker argued that the quo warranto action was improper and that State law allowed him to have his name on the ballot. However, the Appellate Court warned General Parker to stop making those arguments as the decision for his name to be removed from the ballot would stand.

General Parker has now filed a complaint in federal court against those who sought removal of his name from the ballot. In it, the District Court addressed:

1. A Fourteenth Amendment “Class–of–One” Equal Protection claim alleging that General Parker was selectively targeted the quo warranto action, a rarely-used enforcement mechanism, because of his reputation as an outspoken leader in the community. The Court held that it is the State’s Attorney’s discretion to file quo warranto actions and dismissed this claim.

2. A Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claim alleging racial discrimination because he was targeted to be removed from the school board election ballot to preserve a white majority on the school board. He alleges that other white candidates for various local elected offices are or have been ineligible but were not subject to quo warranto actions or other challenges by the State's Attorney. The Court held that this claim should be heard.

3. A general challenge to the constitutionality of the state laws preventing someone with a prior felony conviction from running for school board, citing the First, Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. The Court held that this claim should be heard.

While the Court dismissed number 1, the merits on numbers 2 and 3 are still pending.