Recent Court Decisions

A school principal wrote a rebuttal to a separation of employment letter from the superintendent. A local newspaper requested the copy of the rebuttal letter under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The school denied disclosure under section 7(1)(C) for personal privacy and 7.5(q), which prevents disclosures otherwise prohibited under the Personnel Record Review Act. The school sent the office of Public Access Counselor (PAC) a preauthorization request indicating the intent to deny disclosure under the two exemptions under the FOIA. PAC addressed both exemptions and found that neither was applicable to the school. The Illinois Press Association then sent the school a letter asking them to reconsider the denial of releasing the letter. The school responded by asserting a third exemption under the FOIA. This exemption was section 7 (1) (n), which exempts records relating to a public body’s adjudication of an employee grievance or disciplinary case. The newspaper did not wait to hear from PAC concerning the third exemption and filed suit. After filing suit, the school released the letter to the newspaper on their own accord.

In filing suit, the newspaper was now looking to collect attorney’s fees and to impose a civil penalty on the school for their delay in disclosure. The school did not have to pay the newspapers attorney’s fees because the newspaper did not prevail. In order to prevail, the newspaper had to have received judicially sanctioned relief. The school released the letter without any direction from the court and the newspaper did not prevail. A civil penalty was imposed on the school according to section 11 (j) of the FOIA. The court found that the school willfully and intentionally failed to comply with the FOIA and was fined $2,500.

Rachel Prezek, IASB Law Clerk

District 159. The contract contained plans to formulate performance goals. After the superintendent’s first year, the Board of Education opted not to renew his employment contract. The superintendent filed suit against the Board, seeking to enforce the employment contract and retain his position. The superintendent also stated he had a property interest in his employment and termination without a hearing was a violation of his due process rights. The Board claimed that the employment contract was void because it did not include performance goals as required by the Illinois School Code, only plans to formulate goals. When a contract violates the law, it is rendered void. The Court found the employment contract was in violation of the Illinois School Code, and therefore void and unenforceable. Because the contract was void, the superintendent did not have a protectable property interest in continued employment. Consequently, the Court dismissed the superintendent’s due process claim.

The school board properly followed procedural requirements of Sections 34-8.3(a), (b), and (c) of School Code (Section 34 applies to Chicago Public Schools). Those sections apply to the removal of principals for schools on probation. The school board's decision to remove the Plaintiff as a principal was not against manifest weight of evidence.

[NOTE: This appeal arises from the same underlying facts where Roxana Comm. Unit School Dist. No. 1 (RCUSD) asked for and was granted an injunction against the Illinois Pollution Control Board. The injunction required the PCB to (1) stop violating the OMA and (2) hold all of its future meetings in public pending the outcome of the trial on the allegations by RCUSD that PCB violated FOIA and OMA. See Roxana CUSD #1 v. WRB Refining, LP and EPA, Pollution Control Board & Dept. of Revenue, Ill. App. 4th 120331 (2012) (available in RC&AD archives) and Roxana Community Unit School Dist. No. 1 v. Environmental Protection Agency, --- N.E.2d ---, 2013 IL App (4th) 120825 (November 14, 2013) (available in the RC&AD District Organization and Operation section).]

In this appeal, the RCUSD asked the Illinois Supreme Court to review an appellate court decision. The appellate court found that it did not have jurisdiction (authority) to hear an appeal that was filed by the RCUSD. Using a provision in the Ill. Environmental Protection Act, RCUSD appealed directly to the appellate court (as opposed to the circuit court). RCUSD appealed the Pollution Control Board’s order denying its petitions to intervene in proceedings before the Pollution Control Board. The proceedings involved whether or not to certify a facility as a “pollution control facility.” The Illinois Supreme Court agreed with the appellate court. It found that RCUSD did not qualify or assert itself under any of the categories listed in the Ill. Environmental Protection Act, which are authorized to appeal a Pollution Control Board decision directly to an appellate court.

This case may be of interest to school officials because the Illinois Eavesdropping statute applies to any conversation, including lawfully closed meetings under the Illinois Open Meetings Act. What that means is that while a recording of a closed meeting is required by the Illinois Open Meetings Act, an individual in a closed meeting making his or her own recording without the knowledge or consent of others present in the closed meeting would violate the Eavesdropping statute in Illinois. This case discusses the “fear of crime” exception to the Illinois Eavesdropping Act.

Mary Carroll called her coworker, Jim Kelliher late on a Thanksgiving Day. According to Carroll, she was “riled up” and she snapped on the phone. Kelliher’s wife overheard Carroll on the other end of the phone and recorded the conversation without Carroll’s knowledge. Kelliher was frightened after the phone call, and he reported it to his supervisors at Merrill Lynch. Carroll was fired for the phone call and initiated this suit as a violation of the Illinois Eavesdropping statute. The Illinois Eavesdropping statute prohibits recording conversations without the consent of all the parties and the subsequent use of that recording. 720 ILCS 5/14-2 (a)(1). The fear of crime exemption allows unauthorized recordings under a reasonable suspicion that another party to the conversation is committing, about to commit, or has committed a criminal offense against that person or a member of his or her immediate household. To determine a reasonable suspicion, the exemption requires that (1) a subjective suspicion that criminal activity is afoot, and (2) that the suspicion be objectively reasonable.

Carroll argues that the failure of Kelliher to call the police means that there was a lack of reasonable suspicion. However, Illinois criminalizes phone calls made with the intent to abuse, threaten or harass any person at the called number. 720 ILCS 135/1-1(2). Carroll’s own admission that she was angry and snapped on the phone can be used as evidence of the abusive nature of the phone call. Further, Kelliher’s wife had a reasonable suspicion of a crime, so her recording fell under the fear of crime exemption.

Rachel Prezek, IASB Law Clerk