Recent Court Decisions

The Office of the Governor violated FOIA by failing to comply with, deny in whole or in part, or otherwise appropriately respond to a FOIA request. On September 14, 2017, an individual submitted a request for a log of FOIA requests received by the Governor since July 1, 2017. The requestor received no response and subsequently requested the PAC review the Governor’s failure to respond. The PAC found that the Governor violated Section 3(d) of FOIA by failing to provide the requested records or to respond in writing to the FOIA request. The PAC ordered the Governor’s Office to immediately provide all records in response to the FOIA requestor, subject only to any permissible redactions under Section 7.

This opinion is binding only to the parties involved and may be appealed pursuant to State law.

Sarah Spriesch worked as a fire department paramedic for the City of Chicago. In the summer of 2014, she informed her supervisor that she was pregnant, and she was immediately forced to go on leave for the rest of her pregnancy. She returned to work two months after giving birth and requested accommodations so that she could pump and express breastmilk at work. The City did not consistently allow Ms. Spriesch to take breaks to pump, nor did it provide her with regular access to a private, non-bathroom space in which she could pump and express breastmilk. Upon returning from leave, Ms. Spriesch was assigned to a paramedic “relief pool,” which meant she received temporary assignments at a number of firehouses, some of which did not have private, non-bathroom areas. Ms. Spriesch brought several claims against the City, including pregnancy discrimination under Title VII, a pregnancy/childbirth accommodation claim under the Illinois Human Rights Act (IHRA), and breastfeeding accommodation claims under the federal Fair Labor Standards act and the Illinois Nursing Mothers in the Workplace Act (INMWA).

The City filed a motion to dismiss Ms. Spriesch’s claims. Most significantly, with regard to her INMWA claim, the court recognized that the law implies a private right of action, even though it does not expressly provide for one, so the City could potentially be liable to Ms. Spriesch for its failure to accommodate her as a nursing mother under the INMWA. The City also claimed that Ms. Spriesch’s Title VII pregnancy discrimination claim was time-barred because she filed her EEOC charge well over a year after she was placed on leave for her pregnancy; however, the court found her claim could be timely under a “continuing violation” theory, since other acts of discrimination were alleged to have occurred after that time. The court also allowed Ms. Spriesch to proceed on her IHRA discrimination claim for acts that occurred after date the IHRA was amended (January 1, 2015) to require employers to provide reasonable accommodations for medical and other common conditions related to pregnancy or childbirth.

This case emphasizes how important it is for school districts, as employers, to provide reasonable accommodations for pregnant and nursing employees. Otherwise, a district may face liability under a number of federal and state laws. The footnotes in the sample PRESS Policy 5:10, Equal Opportunity and Minority Recruitment, as well PRESS administrative procedure 5:10-AP, Workplace Accommodations for Working Mothers, provide further information about the legal requirements for such accommodations.

In 2005, Audrey Shanton, a computer lab assistant at St. Charles Community Unit School District 303, and her husband, developed a basic computer program that could track certain student information, such as student attendance, based on reading barcodes. The original program was created outside of work and without the District’s knowledge. In 2008, the District became aware of the program and asked Ms. Shanton if she would regularly update the program for use in the District. Ms. Shanton agreed to do so, albeit informally, and she rewrote and updated the program every year for the District through 2015. In 2015, the District informed her that it no longer wanted an updated program because it was going to use a new commercial program. Ms. Shanton, upon viewing the commercial program, believed it was a reversed engineered version of the derivative program she created in 2008. She sued the District for copyright infringement, claiming she owned the derivatives of the original 2005 program.

The District sought to have Ms. Shanton’s infringement claim dismissed on the basis that the derivative works of her original 2005 program were “works for hire” and belonged to the District. The court considered a number of factors to determine if the works belonged to Ms. Shanton or the District: (1) the hiring party’s right to control the manner and means by which the product is accomplished; (2) the skill required to create the material; (3) the location of the work; (4) the duration of the relationship between the parties; (5) whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the hired party; and (6) the provision of employee benefits. The court sided with the District and dismissed the infringement claim, finding that although Ms. Shanton maintained close control over the program updates after 2008 and could have rewritten the program off school grounds, it was clear that she was acting as an agent of the District because the program updates were made at the District’s request and on District property, and she received no additional pay for the updates. This case illustrates that works made within the scope of one’s employment belong to the employer, and it appears to be the first case in Illinois to specifically address the work for hire doctrine in the K-12 context. Whether a particular work qualifies as a work for hire is entirely dependent on the particular facts of a situation. Sample PRESS Policy 5:170, Copyright, generally addresses works made for hire and directs the superintendent to manage the development of instructional materials and computer programs authored by employees in the scope of their employment.

The school district had the right to not only discipline student C.E. for racist and derogatory content directed toward specific students that he posted on an Instagram account, but also to discipline other students who commented on and/or “liked” certain posts.

In November 2016, Plaintiff C.E. created an Instagram account and granted access to a group of Albany High School (AHS) students. In March 2017, AHS students and school personnel discovered the account and its contents. The account contained 30-40 posts, many of which targeted AHS students and school personnel with racist and derogatory content, including a picture of an African-American AHS student and an African-American AHS basketball coach with nooses drawn around their necks. The district expelled C.E. and suspended students who had commented on or “liked” C.E.’s posts, as well as one student who had access to the account but never commented on or otherwise responded to it online.

The Court first considered whether the speech at issue was school speech, and found that it was because a “nexus” to the school existed (account followers were mostly school students, the posts featured 10 different students and school personnel, and the posts depicted school activities and were clearly taken on campus). In addition, even though C.E. intended that the Instagram account remain private, it was reasonably foreseeable that the speech would reach the school and create a risk of substantial disruption.

Next, the Court found that because the speech substantially disrupted school and invaded the rights of others, the district appropriately disciplined C.E. and those who commented on or “liked” his posts that targeted specific students. “There is no doubt that these plaintiffs meaningfully contributed to the disruptions at AHS by embracing C.E.’s posts in this fashion” the Court stated.

Notably, the Court did not uphold the discipline of four other students, who had neither approved of nor adopted any content targeting specific individuals within the school. The Court reasoned that “endorsement of speech that is offensive or noxious at a general level differs from endorsement or encouragement of speech that specifically targets individual students.”

This case is not binding in Illinois, however it reflects the increasing trend of courts to recognize the right of school districts to discipline students for certain misconduct that occurs off-campus via social media.

In February 2012, full-time tenured special education teacher Michelle Frakes received an “unsatisfactory” performance rating. Frakes refused to sign the rating, asserting it was unfair, and she formalized her opposition in a written document entitled “Points of Rebuttal.” In the “Points of Rebuttal,” Frakes admitted she needed to improve her performance and classroom management but defended her teaching methods. Frakes was placed on a remediation plan, but before it went into effect she requested and was placed on medical leave due to serious health conditions. Frakes’ unsatisfactory rating placed her and nine other full-time tenured teachers in “Group 2” on the “sequence of honorable dismissal list.” On April 9, 2012 Frakes, along with 54 other teachers, was honorably dismissed in a voluntary reduction in force.

Frakes sued the District in federal court, alleging that her “unsatisfactory” rating and subsequent honorable dismissal interfered with her ability to aid students in exercising their rights under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The district court granted summary judgement for the District, finding Frakes did not provide evidence that she engaged in protected activity under Section 504. On appeal, in its first time addressing an interference claim under Section 504, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.

The Court first noted that a Section 504 employment discrimination claim is controlled by the standards of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), so it looked at Frakes’ claim through the ADA anti-interference provision, which provides it is unlawful to “coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any individual in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his or her having exercised or enjoyed, or on the account of his or her having aided or encouraged any other individual in the exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by the ADA.” To prevail on her claim, Frakes would need to demonstrate that: (1) she engaged in activity statutorily protected by the ADA; (2) she was engaged in, or aided or encouraged others in, the exercise or enjoyment of ADA protected rights; (3) the defendants coerced, threatened, intimidated, or interfered on account of her protected activity; and (4) the defendants were motivated by an intent to discriminate. Frakes asserted that she engaged in protected activity when she refused to change her teaching methods in response to the “unsatisfactory” rating, but the Court did not buy her assertion, pointing out that she did not dispute her teaching methods in her “Points in Rebuttal,” nor did she mention her students’ rights or interests at all. The Court succinctly held that “the law protects assertions of rights, not teaching methods. The fact that Frakes taught students who are protected by the ADA does not alone render her teaching ‘protected activity.’”