The facts of this case began in an online chat on a suburban newspaper's comment board. The chat was between two individuals (one later identified as a minor) who posted various sarcastic comments about a local election under anonymous screen names. The minor's mother, a candidate in the election, was the subject of much of the chatter.

Using Supreme Court Rule 224 (Ill. S. Ct. R. 224), she ultimately filed a petition on her son's behalf, seeking the discovery of a commenter’s identity (referred to as John Doe). The comments were allegedly defamatory of her child. Initially, the trial court ordered that the identity of the subscriber to the internet protocol (IP) address used by John Doe when posting on the website would be revealed to petitioner.

John Doe appealed. He asserted that the trial court applied the wrong standard because the challenged comments were not defamatory. John Doe also contended that the challenged comments were immune by the Citizen Participation Act, which protects the constitutional rights of citizens and organizations to be involved and participate freely in the process of government.

The appellate court held that John Doe’s identity should not be revealed because the minor’s mother did not allege enough facts to show a cause of action for defamation, which is required under Ill. S. Ct. R. 224. Based upon its ruling, the court did not address John Doe’s assertion that the challenged comments were immune by the Citizen Participation Act. However, this case serves as a reminder to elected officials that citizens have broad First Amendment rights that require elected officials to have thick skin.

The school board properly followed procedural requirements of Sections 34-8.3(a), (b), and (c) of School Code (Section 34 applies to Chicago Public Schools). Those sections apply to the removal of principals for schools on probation. The school board's decision to remove the Plaintiff as a principal was not against manifest weight of evidence.

A former school board member appealed the court order that “ousted” him from serving on a school board for violating the Public Officer Prohibited Activities Act (50 ILCS 105/). That statute prohibits duly holding offices on both a county board and a school board. A few fellow school board members brought an action in “quo warranto” to enforce this law because the former board member was a member of the county board when he was sworn in to the school board. (“Quo warranto” is a legal proceeding that challenges an individual's right to hold an office or governmental privilege.) The appellate court found, among other things, that the court order at the time was proper. Note: During the course of this case, the former school board member ran for the school board again at the next election, and he was elected, sworn in, and is currently serving. For more information about incompatible offices, see the discussion in the Illinois Council of School Attorney’s document titled “Answers to FAQs; Conflict of Interest and Incompatible Offices,” at http://iasb.com/law/FAQsConflictofInterestIncompatibleOffices.pdf.

District 159. The contract contained plans to formulate performance goals. After the superintendent’s first year, the Board of Education opted not to renew his employment contract. The superintendent filed suit against the Board, seeking to enforce the employment contract and retain his position. The superintendent also stated he had a property interest in his employment and termination without a hearing was a violation of his due process rights. The Board claimed that the employment contract was void because it did not include performance goals as required by the Illinois School Code, only plans to formulate goals. When a contract violates the law, it is rendered void. The Court found the employment contract was in violation of the Illinois School Code, and therefore void and unenforceable. Because the contract was void, the superintendent did not have a protectable property interest in continued employment. Consequently, the Court dismissed the superintendent’s due process claim.

The State of Illinois filed a complaint against the Defendant, who held three public offices: alderman, school board member, and park district commissioner. The State sought Defendant’s removal from the office of park district commissioner, alleging it was incompatible with Defendant’s position as alderman. The First District Appellate Court held that the offices of alderman, school board member, and park district commissioner were incompatible, and removed Defendant from all three offices. There does not need to be an actual conflict for offices to be incompatible, just that there will eventually be a conflict. Offices are incompatible when the functions or duties of the offices are inherently inconsistent and repugnant so that one person would be unable to faithfully, impartially, and efficiently discharge the duties of both offices. The Court reasoned that the positions of alderman and park commissioner were incompatible because of contractual relations that may exist between a park district and municipality. A conflict can also arise between an alderman’s duties in voting on the allocation of revenue-sharing funds to a school district, and a school board member’s duty to provide revenue to maintain schools.

Nicole Cudiamat, IASB Extern