The following case is binding in the jurisdiction of the Illinois Appellate Court Third Circuit. Its content may be of interest to school officials in Illinois. It involves a “quo warranto” action. “Quo warranto” actions used to challenge another's right to public office. For more information on quo warranto actions, see the last paragraph below.

Parker, a candidate for the school board, had two felony convictions and filed his papers to become a candidate for his local school board. The State’s Attorney sought a court order to remove Parker’s name from the ballot and stop him from running for the school board. The basis for the request was that Parker was not eligible to run because his felony convictions disqualified him from holding public office pursuant to section 29-15 of the Election Code (10 ILCS 5/29-15). The trial court granted the State's quo warranto motion and barred General Parker from placing his name on the ballot. On appeal, the appellate court upheld the order barring General Parker from placing his name on the ballot.

Quo warranto cases are generally only brought by the Attorney General or the appropriate State's Attorney. If neither of them brings the suit, it may be brought by any citizen after s/he has requested the AG and State's Attorney to bring the same, they fail to do so, and the circuit court grants permission for the citizen to file it. After receiving permission to bring the suit, the citizen must post a bond when filing the proceeding because, if s/he is unsuccessful, s/he must pay the defendant’s attorney fees and costs. Depending upon the alleged violation, the law allows the court to impose a $25,000 fine or remove the board member from office.

A copy of this case is available at the following location:

www.state.il.us/court/R23_Orders/AppellateCourt/2012/3rdDistrict/3110140_R23.pdf

A public body may not meet in a private residence, even when it gives a proper notice and posting of the meeting to the public. Here, a public body called a special meeting due to impending statutory time constraints. The public body knew that its routine meeting location would be closed for a holiday on the special meeting’s date, so it chose a public official’s private residence as the meeting location. The meeting location was not “convenient and open to the public” because a private residence could “reasonably be expected to deter citizens from attending the gathering. Citizens may have felt uncomfortable going to a public official’s home to attend a meeting. In this sense, the private residence was ‘ill-suited’ for a public meeting.”

Names of State University students and graduation information were categorized by the University as “directory information.” Directory information is not exempt from disclosure under Sections 7(1)(a),7(1)(b), or 7(1)(c) of FOIA.

The facts of this case began in an online chat on a suburban newspaper's comment board. The chat was between two individuals (one later identified as a minor) who posted various sarcastic comments about a local election under anonymous screen names. The minor's mother, a candidate in the election, was the subject of much of the chatter.

Using Supreme Court Rule 224 (Ill. S. Ct. R. 224), she ultimately filed a petition on her son's behalf, seeking the discovery of a commenter’s identity (referred to as John Doe). The comments were allegedly defamatory of her child. Initially, the trial court ordered that the identity of the subscriber to the internet protocol (IP) address used by John Doe when posting on the website would be revealed to petitioner.

John Doe appealed. He asserted that the trial court applied the wrong standard because the challenged comments were not defamatory. John Doe also contended that the challenged comments were immune by the Citizen Participation Act, which protects the constitutional rights of citizens and organizations to be involved and participate freely in the process of government.

The appellate court held that John Doe’s identity should not be revealed because the minor’s mother did not allege enough facts to show a cause of action for defamation, which is required under Ill. S. Ct. R. 224. Based upon its ruling, the court did not address John Doe’s assertion that the challenged comments were immune by the Citizen Participation Act. However, this case serves as a reminder to elected officials that citizens have broad First Amendment rights that require elected officials to have thick skin.

The school board properly followed procedural requirements of Sections 34-8.3(a), (b), and (c) of School Code (Section 34 applies to Chicago Public Schools). Those sections apply to the removal of principals for schools on probation. The school board's decision to remove the Plaintiff as a principal was not against manifest weight of evidence.