The following case is from Ohio. It is not binding in Illinois. However, its facts and the ruling may be of interest to school officials. See the General Area “Public Access Counselor Opinions” for more information on the Illinois Open Meetings Act.

Patricia Paridon, among others, filed a complaint on October 20, 2011 for an injunction on the Trumbull County Children’s Services Board’s (“the board”) sign-in policy for public meetings. An injunction is a court order requiring a party to do something or to stop a party from doing something. Paridon asked the court to stop the board from enforcing its sign-in policy. The complaint alleged that on October 18, 2011, Paridon was not allowed to enter a public meeting of the board because she refused to sign a sign-in sheet in accordance with the board’s sign-in policy. Furthermore, the complaint alleged that this policy violated Ohio’s Sunshine Law. The trial court denied Paridon’s request for an injunction and she appealed the trial court’s judgment to the Court of Appeals.

The purpose of the board’s policy is to protect children that are within the board’s care and live at the board’s facility. The policy is also intended to protect the confidential records located within the facility. This facility is also where the public meetings are held. After a member of the public signs their name to the sign-in sheet, they are permitted to enter the meeting. The board does not verify the names of the individuals who have signed-in nor do they perform a background check.

Paridon made several arguments against the board’s policy. Among these arguments, Paridon stated that the Ohio’s Sunshine Law provided individuals with an absolute right to be present at public meetings. The court disagreed with this argument and stated that Ohio’s Sunshine Law does not preclude a public agency from instituting a policy requiring individuals to sign-in prior to admission to a public meeting. Paridon also argued that the board has not consistently required members of the public to sign-in prior to admission to a public meeting. However, the court stated that there was no evidence prior to this instance in which the board did not maintain a sign-in policy. Paridon then argued that Ohio’s Sunshine Law does not contain a sign-in requirement for public meeting and therefore, the board cannot implement one. The court disagreed with this argument as well, stating that the board may place access restrictions on their public meetings so long as these restrictions are content-neutral and narrowly tailored to serve a significant interest.

The court disagreed with all of Paridon’s remaining arguments. The court stated that the board’s sign-policy was content-neutral and narrowly tailored to assist in the board’s goal of protecting the children and the board’s confidential records. The court also stated that the sign-in policy was not intrusive into the lives of those wishing to attend the public meeting because it merely required a prospective attendee to sign his or her name to a sheet of paper. Furthermore, the policy did not prohibit individuals from attending the meeting. Rather, they had a choice to either sign their name or not. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling denying Paridon’s request for an injunction.

Melissa-Ann E. Evanchik, IASB Law Clerk

This case may be of interest to school officials because the Illinois Eavesdropping statute applies to any conversation, including lawfully closed meetings under the Illinois Open Meetings Act. What that means is that while a recording of a closed meeting is required by the Illinois Open Meetings Act, an individual in a closed meeting making his or her own recording without the knowledge or consent of others present in the closed meeting would violate the Eavesdropping statute in Illinois. This case discusses the “fear of crime” exception to the Illinois Eavesdropping Act.

Mary Carroll called her coworker, Jim Kelliher late on a Thanksgiving Day. According to Carroll, she was “riled up” and she snapped on the phone. Kelliher’s wife overheard Carroll on the other end of the phone and recorded the conversation without Carroll’s knowledge. Kelliher was frightened after the phone call, and he reported it to his supervisors at Merrill Lynch. Carroll was fired for the phone call and initiated this suit as a violation of the Illinois Eavesdropping statute. The Illinois Eavesdropping statute prohibits recording conversations without the consent of all the parties and the subsequent use of that recording. 720 ILCS 5/14-2 (a)(1). The fear of crime exemption allows unauthorized recordings under a reasonable suspicion that another party to the conversation is committing, about to commit, or has committed a criminal offense against that person or a member of his or her immediate household. To determine a reasonable suspicion, the exemption requires that (1) a subjective suspicion that criminal activity is afoot, and (2) that the suspicion be objectively reasonable.

Carroll argues that the failure of Kelliher to call the police means that there was a lack of reasonable suspicion. However, Illinois criminalizes phone calls made with the intent to abuse, threaten or harass any person at the called number. 720 ILCS 135/1-1(2). Carroll’s own admission that she was angry and snapped on the phone can be used as evidence of the abusive nature of the phone call. Further, Kelliher’s wife had a reasonable suspicion of a crime, so her recording fell under the fear of crime exemption.

Rachel Prezek, IASB Law Clerk

A school principal wrote a rebuttal to a separation of employment letter from the superintendent. A local newspaper requested the copy of the rebuttal letter under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The school denied disclosure under section 7(1)(C) for personal privacy and 7.5(q), which prevents disclosures otherwise prohibited under the Personnel Record Review Act. The school sent the office of Public Access Counselor (PAC) a preauthorization request indicating the intent to deny disclosure under the two exemptions under the FOIA. PAC addressed both exemptions and found that neither was applicable to the school. The Illinois Press Association then sent the school a letter asking them to reconsider the denial of releasing the letter. The school responded by asserting a third exemption under the FOIA. This exemption was section 7 (1) (n), which exempts records relating to a public body’s adjudication of an employee grievance or disciplinary case. The newspaper did not wait to hear from PAC concerning the third exemption and filed suit. After filing suit, the school released the letter to the newspaper on their own accord.

In filing suit, the newspaper was now looking to collect attorney’s fees and to impose a civil penalty on the school for their delay in disclosure. The school did not have to pay the newspapers attorney’s fees because the newspaper did not prevail. In order to prevail, the newspaper had to have received judicially sanctioned relief. The school released the letter without any direction from the court and the newspaper did not prevail. A civil penalty was imposed on the school according to section 11 (j) of the FOIA. The court found that the school willfully and intentionally failed to comply with the FOIA and was fined $2,500.

Rachel Prezek, IASB Law Clerk

A three-member Board of Trustees (Board) held a meeting where two of its members attended. Two members equal a quorum on this type of public body. The members who attended the meeting were Mr. Bertrand and Ms. Mallory. During the meeting, they went into closed session to discuss a proposed settlement agreement of a lawsuit against the Board, brought by Mr. Bertrand. When the closed session ended, Ms. Mallory moved for the Board to approve a settlement agreement with Mr. Bertrand. Mr. Bertrand seconded the motion. Ms. Mallory voted “yea,” and Mr. Bertrand abstained from voting. The Board considered the motion passed.

Community members sued the Board over this motion. Then, the Ill. Attorney General intervened (took over). It argued that the settlement agreement was void for two reasons: (1) Mr. Bertrand’s actions violated section 3(a) of the Public Officer Prohibited Activities Act (“Act”) because he participated in the negotiation of the settlement agreement, and (2) Ms. Mallory’s one yea vote out of a quorum of two members did not equal a majority to pass the motion for approval of the settlement agreement.

Agreeing with both arguments, the court held the settlement agreement was void. First, the court held that Mr. Bertrand had personal pecuniary interests that conflicted with his duty not to use his elected office for his own financial gain. Conflict of interest statutes are passed to “discourage this type of ethical dilemma and the abuses that stem from it.” Second, the court held that although the Board had a quorum and could legally hold a meeting with a quorum of two, one vote for the proposed settlement agreement was not enough to pass the motion. A majority means the number greater than half of any total. When an affirmative vote of yes is required (e.g., expenditures of money), then only an actual “yea” or “aye” vote is counted toward passage of the motion. Any abstention or attempt to vote other than “yea” or “aye”, including abstaining, operates as a “nay” vote. Mr. Bertrand’s abstention had the effect of a “nay” vote.

Heinrich submitted a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for access to administrative decisions by the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) regarding licenses that were suspended or revoked by the Secretary of State (SOS). Heinrich also requested the DMV decisions within one year. This request sought documents that were not yet created, but it also sought records that did exist. The SOS denied Heinrich’s FOIA request because (1) the information contained in the documents was private, and (2) the requested documents did not exist.

Under 2-123 (f-5) of the Ill. Vehicle Code, the SOS cannot disclose or make otherwise available any personally identifying information obtained by the SOS in connection with a driver’s license, vehicle or title registration record. However, this section does not include information like vehicular accidents, driving violations, and driving status. Under section 7 of the FOIA, personal information like driver’s license numbers or home addresses are exempt from disclosure.

The appellate court concluded that the SOS should have turned over the documents with the personal information redacted. A FOIA request cannot be dismissed because part of a request is invalid, and although the documents contained private information, it could be redacted (blacking-out private information). While the trial court decided that the redacted documents were likely useless, the appellate court found that it is not the trial court’s job to decide if redacted documents are useless.

The SOS also argued that the production of the documents would be burdensome. However, the appellate court offered that to prove that a request is burdensome, the elements that must be present are: (1) compliance with the request must be unduly burdensome, (2) there must be no way to narrow the request, and (3) the burden on the public body must outweigh the public interest. The case was reversed and sent back to the lower court to review the burden of Heinrich’s request under this test and Heinrich’s continued need for the information.

Rachel Prezek, IASB Law Clerk