A school board improperly took final action in a closed session and then ratified the improper action several meetings later during open session. During the closed session, six of the seven school board members who were present signed a separation agreement. The PAC found that signing a final separation agreement in closed session constituted a final approval by the board. While the board later took action and ratified the separation agreement in open session, the PAC found that the action taken in open session did not cure the closed session violation. That was because the school board failed to adequately inform the public of the nature of the matter under consideration prior to the vote. The PAC considered the board’s description of the matter under consideration to be vague and general because it called for a “vote to approve the separation agreement with the administrator.” Last, a reference to an administrator’s name, along with a vague reference to a “personnel matter,” violated the board’s duty to provide minutes with a “summary of discussion on all matters proposed, deliberated, or decided, and a record of any votes taken.” In addition, other violations were discussed, e.g., the verbatim recording requirement during closed session was not followed and/or failed during the closed sessions in question.

A public body is required to have one or more FOIA officers designated and acting at all times and to provide notice of the procedures for obtaining records to the public in accordance with the requirements of the Act. A public body did not properly respond to a citizen’s FOIA request. The opinion reiterates: (1) that it is a “fundamental obligation of government to operate openly and provide public records as expediently and efficiently as possible in compliance with this Act" (5 ILCS 140/1), and (2) that the procedures for responding to a FOIA request are clear under 5 ILCS 140/3(d). It states the following: Each public body shall, promptly, either comply with or deny a request for public records within 5 business days after its receipt of the request, unless the time for response is properly extended under subsection (e) of this Section. Denial shall be in writing as provided in Section 9 of this Act. Failure to comply with a written request, extend the time for response, or deny a request within 5 business days after its receipt shall be considered a denial of the request. A public body that fails to respond to a request within the requisite periods in this Section but thereafter provides the requester with copies of the requested public records may not impose a fee for such copies. A public body that fails to respond to a request received may not treat the request as unduly burdensome under subsection (g).

A public body improperly voted during closed session to terminate a tenured university faculty member. Taking final action during closed session is prohibited by 5 ILCS 120/2(e).

Public bodies must set forth a description of the general subject matter that will be the subject of final action at the meeting. Here, standing committees of a public body had a practice of meeting during the morning of the day that their public body held its regular meetings. Then, the standing committees would refer their actions from the morning for the public body to take final action upon in the afternoon’s regular meeting. None of the standing committees’ actions were posted for final action on the public body’s agenda for the afternoon regular meeting. However, the standing committees’ actions were posted on the standing committee’s agendas for the morning. The PAC found this process violates 105 ILCS 120/2.02(c). To stop the violations, the PAC suggested that the public body list the same description of actions on its agenda that the standing committees would consider during the morning meetings.

This case originates from a state “quo warranto” action to remove General Parker’s name from the school board ballot for a prior felony conviction. See People ex rel. Lyons v. Parker, 2012 IL App (3d) 110140-U, (Order filed 5/8/2012), summarized directly below and available here:

http://www.state.il.us/court/R23_Orders/AppellateCourt/2012/3rdDistrict/3110140_R23.pdf.

A quo warranto action is used to challenge another’s right to public office. In the 2012 case, the State’s Attorney successfully obtained an order barring General Parker from running for the local school board. General Parker argued that the quo warranto action was improper and that State law allowed him to have his name on the ballot. However, the Appellate Court warned General Parker to stop making those arguments as the decision for his name to be removed from the ballot would stand.

General Parker has now filed a complaint in federal court against those who sought removal of his name from the ballot. In it, the District Court addressed:

1. A Fourteenth Amendment “Class–of–One” Equal Protection claim alleging that General Parker was selectively targeted the quo warranto action, a rarely-used enforcement mechanism, because of his reputation as an outspoken leader in the community. The Court held that it is the State’s Attorney’s discretion to file quo warranto actions and dismissed this claim.

2. A Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claim alleging racial discrimination because he was targeted to be removed from the school board election ballot to preserve a white majority on the school board. He alleges that other white candidates for various local elected offices are or have been ineligible but were not subject to quo warranto actions or other challenges by the State's Attorney. The Court held that this claim should be heard.

3. A general challenge to the constitutionality of the state laws preventing someone with a prior felony conviction from running for school board, citing the First, Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. The Court held that this claim should be heard.

While the Court dismissed number 1, the merits on numbers 2 and 3 are still pending.