The school district had the right to not only discipline student C.E. for racist and derogatory content directed toward specific students that he posted on an Instagram account, but also to discipline other students who commented on and/or “liked” certain posts.

In November 2016, Plaintiff C.E. created an Instagram account and granted access to a group of Albany High School (AHS) students. In March 2017, AHS students and school personnel discovered the account and its contents. The account contained 30-40 posts, many of which targeted AHS students and school personnel with racist and derogatory content, including a picture of an African-American AHS student and an African-American AHS basketball coach with nooses drawn around their necks. The district expelled C.E. and suspended students who had commented on or “liked” C.E.’s posts, as well as one student who had access to the account but never commented on or otherwise responded to it online.

The Court first considered whether the speech at issue was school speech, and found that it was because a “nexus” to the school existed (account followers were mostly school students, the posts featured 10 different students and school personnel, and the posts depicted school activities and were clearly taken on campus). In addition, even though C.E. intended that the Instagram account remain private, it was reasonably foreseeable that the speech would reach the school and create a risk of substantial disruption.

Next, the Court found that because the speech substantially disrupted school and invaded the rights of others, the district appropriately disciplined C.E. and those who commented on or “liked” his posts that targeted specific students. “There is no doubt that these plaintiffs meaningfully contributed to the disruptions at AHS by embracing C.E.’s posts in this fashion” the Court stated.

Notably, the Court did not uphold the discipline of four other students, who had neither approved of nor adopted any content targeting specific individuals within the school. The Court reasoned that “endorsement of speech that is offensive or noxious at a general level differs from endorsement or encouragement of speech that specifically targets individual students.”

This case is not binding in Illinois, however it reflects the increasing trend of courts to recognize the right of school districts to discipline students for certain misconduct that occurs off-campus via social media.

A Board of Trustees of a village (Board) violated OMA by improperly using Section 2(c)(4) to enter closed session to discuss the conduct of one of its Board members.

Here, the Board member whose conduct was at issue had made racist comments during a May 2017 Board meeting. In response, the agenda for the Board’s August 8, 2017 meeting identified a resolution concerning the Board member’s comments as an item for discussion, however the Board entered closed session for the discussion and cited Section 2(c)(4) of OMA to do so. Section 2(c)(4) allows a public body to enter closed session to discuss “evidence or testimony presented in open hearing, or in a closed hearing where specifically authorized by law, to a quasi-adjudicative body.” Under OMA, a “quasi-adjudicative body” is “an administrative body charged by law or ordinance with the responsibility to conduct hearings, receive evidence or testimony and make determinations based thereon, but does not include local electoral boards when such bodies are considering petition challenges.”

Upon reviewing the closed session verbatim recording of the August meeting, the PAC found that the Board did not consider evidence or testimony – they just discussed a resolution regarding the Board member’s comments. Even if the Board had considered evidence or testimony, they would have done so as a legislative body, so Section 2(c)(4) could not apply.

Because the Board improperly entered closed session to discuss the conduct of one of its members, the PAC ordered the Board to publicly disclose the portion of the closed session verbatim recording containing this discussion.

This opinion is binding only to the parties involved and may be appealed pursuant to State law.

McClean County (County) violated FOIA by denying a request made on September 6, 2017, for copies of recent FOIA requests submitted to the County and its responses to those requests. The County denied the FOIA request on the basis that it “did not meet the purpose and intent of [FOIA].” It believed that the requester was improperly trying to obtain information about private individuals rather than information concerning government. The County, however, did not assert any specific statutory exemptions under FOIA in its denial. The PAC found that the County’s denial of the request was improper because under Section 3(c) of FOIA, public bodies may not “require the requester to specify the purpose for a request, except to determine whether the records are requested for a commercial purpose or whether to grant a request for a fee waiver.” FOIA does not allow a public body to deny a FOIA request based on what it believes to be the underlying motive of the request. The PAC ordered the County to provide records responsive to the FOIA request, subject only to redactions permitted under Section 7 of FOIA.

This opinion is binding only to the parties involved and may be appealed pursuant to State law.

A County Housing Authority (Housing Authority) violated FOIA by improperly denying the release of recordings of public board meetings in response to a reporter’s FOIA request. On August 23, 2017, a reporter requested, among other items, copies of “all audio recordings taken during Board of Commissioner meetings in 2017.” The Housing Authority denied the request for audio recordings, stating they were preliminary materials exempt from disclosure under FOIA Section 7(1)(f).

The Section 7(1)(f) exemption applies to “preliminary drafts, notes, recommendations, memoranda and other records in which opinions are expressed, or policies or actions are formulated, except that a specific record or relevant portion of a record shall not be exempt when the record is publicly cited and identified by the head of the public body.” Importantly, Section 7(1)(f) is intended to protect the communication process and encourage frank and open discussion before a final decision is made, so only portions that reflect the give and take of the deliberative process may be withheld.

On review, the PAC found that Section 7(1)(f) does not apply to recordings of public meetings because information that is already public knowledge is not within the scope of the deliberative process exemption. Although the verbatim recordings may reflect preliminary discussions of matters pending before the public body, by virtue of the meetings being open to the public their recordings are subject to disclosure. The PAC ordered the Housing Authority to immediately disclose the recordings to the reporter.

This opinion is binding only to the parties involved and may be appealed pursuant to State law.

Sarah Spriesch worked as a fire department paramedic for the City of Chicago. In the summer of 2014, she informed her supervisor that she was pregnant, and she was immediately forced to go on leave for the rest of her pregnancy. She returned to work two months after giving birth and requested accommodations so that she could pump and express breastmilk at work. The City did not consistently allow Ms. Spriesch to take breaks to pump, nor did it provide her with regular access to a private, non-bathroom space in which she could pump and express breastmilk. Upon returning from leave, Ms. Spriesch was assigned to a paramedic “relief pool,” which meant she received temporary assignments at a number of firehouses, some of which did not have private, non-bathroom areas. Ms. Spriesch brought several claims against the City, including pregnancy discrimination under Title VII, a pregnancy/childbirth accommodation claim under the Illinois Human Rights Act (IHRA), and breastfeeding accommodation claims under the federal Fair Labor Standards act and the Illinois Nursing Mothers in the Workplace Act (INMWA).

The City filed a motion to dismiss Ms. Spriesch’s claims. Most significantly, with regard to her INMWA claim, the court recognized that the law implies a private right of action, even though it does not expressly provide for one, so the City could potentially be liable to Ms. Spriesch for its failure to accommodate her as a nursing mother under the INMWA. The City also claimed that Ms. Spriesch’s Title VII pregnancy discrimination claim was time-barred because she filed her EEOC charge well over a year after she was placed on leave for her pregnancy; however, the court found her claim could be timely under a “continuing violation” theory, since other acts of discrimination were alleged to have occurred after that time. The court also allowed Ms. Spriesch to proceed on her IHRA discrimination claim for acts that occurred after date the IHRA was amended (January 1, 2015) to require employers to provide reasonable accommodations for medical and other common conditions related to pregnancy or childbirth.

This case emphasizes how important it is for school districts, as employers, to provide reasonable accommodations for pregnant and nursing employees. Otherwise, a district may face liability under a number of federal and state laws. The footnotes in the sample PRESS Policy 5:10, Equal Opportunity and Minority Recruitment, as well PRESS administrative procedure 5:10-AP, Workplace Accommodations for Working Mothers, provide further information about the legal requirements for such accommodations.