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Recent Court Decisions

Recent court and agency decisions involving board work

IASB's Office of General Counsel prepares summaries chosen from the Illinois Supreme and Appellate courts, federal court, agencies, the Illinois Public Access Counselor, and other tribunals issuing interesting decisions. Information in the summaries is limited to a brief synopsis and is not intended for purposes of legal advice. For the complete text of any case cited in this section, go to the Illinois state courts, Illinois Attorney General, or Federal courts finder links.

To search by the names of the plaintiff or defendant or other keyword, use the site search box located at the top of this website. Then filter results by Court Decision.

Questions regarding Recent Court and Agency Decisions should be directed to Maryam Brotine, ext. 1219, or by [email protected].

Court decisions are listed in order of the date posted, with the most recent shown first.

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  • Freedom of Information Act - FOIA
    Failure to Respond to FOIA Request Violates Section 3(d) of FOIA
    Case: Public Access Opinion 23-001
    Decision Date: Thursday, January 12, 2023
    On August 12, 2022, Requestor submitted a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the Proviso Township High School District 209 (District) seeking any records relating to staffing levels for teachers in school year 2023. The District did not respond to the request. At the District’s Board of Education (Board) meeting on September 13, 2022 the District acknowledged having received Requestor’s FOIA request in its FOIA report to the Board, stating that “information will be provided”.  

    On October 13 and 14, 2022, Requestor filed a Request for Review with the Public Access Counselor (PAC) in which he alleged that the District had failed to respond to his FOIA request.

    On October 21, 2022, the PAC emailed the District asking if the District had received the request and directing the District to respond to the request and to send a copy of the response to the PAC. On November 15, 2022, The PAC re-sent the October 21, 2022 letter to the District. On November 16, 2022, The PAC sent a letter to the FOIA Officer for the District, explaining that the PAC had not received any indication that the District had responded to Requestor’s request. The District did not respond to PAC correspondence.

    Section 3(a) of FOIA provides that “each public body shall make available to any person for inspection or copying all public records…” Section 3(d) of FOIA further provides, “Each public body shall, promptly, either comply with or deny a request or public records within 5 business days after its receipt of the request… Failure to comply with a written request, extend the time for response, or deny a request within 5 business days after its receipt shall be considered a denial of the request.”

    The PAC found that the District did not respond to Requestor’s August 12, 2022 FOIA request within five business days after its receipt by either complying with the request, extending the time for its response pursuant to section 3(e) of FOIA, or denying the request in writing. The failure of the District to comply with the requisite response procedures violated section 3(d) of FOIA. The PAC ordered the District to take immediate and appropriate action to provide Requestor with all records responsive to his August 12, 2022 request, subject only to permissible redactions, if any, under section 7 of FOIA.

    This opinion is binding only to the parties involved and may be appealed pursuant to State law.

    Mary H. Bandstra, IASB Law Clerk
  • General Interest to School Officials
    Withholding Union Dues From Union Member Paycheck is Not a Violation of First Amendment Rights
    Case: Adriana Ramon Baro v. Lake County Federation of Teachers Local 504, 57 F.4th 582 (7th Cir. 2023)
    Decision Date: Friday, January 6, 2023
    On January 6, 2023, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (Court) issued its decision in Adriana Ramon Baro v. Lake County Federation of Teachers Local 504 (Ramon Baro), holding that withholding of union dues to which a union member has voluntarily consented is not a violation of First Amendment rights.

    Petitioner signed a contract for union membership at orientation to her teaching position. Several days later when she learned that union membership was not mandatory, she sent letters to the school district (District) and the union, trying to revoke her membership. The union informed her she would need to wait until the following August – the published membership revocation time – to revoke her membership. Union dues were withdrawn from her paychecks. Petitioner filed this lawsuit. The union then sent Petitioner a letter confirming that she was no longer a union member and reimbursing all paid dues plus legal fees with a check. The District halted withdrawing her dues the same day. Petitioner returned the check and continued pursuing legal action. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Petitioner appealed.

    The Court’s decision builds on the 2018 Mark Janus v. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, Council 31, et al., 535 (Janus), case in which the United States Supreme Court found that “fair share fees” paid by nonunion members to unions are unconstitutional.

    The Court found that Janus does not apply to union members who voluntarily signed union membership contracts. “…[Petitioner] voluntarily signed a valid contract, became a union member, and accepted the terms and conditions of union membership. Accordingly… Janus – a case about the First Amendment rights of employees who choose not to join unions – does not apply to [Petitioner].” 

    Additionally, the Court found that ordinary contract principles apply when interpreting union membership contracts. “Illinois follows the objective theory of intent, whereby the court looks first to the written agreement and not to the parties’ subjective understandings.” The Court found that the objective intent of the parties was clear from the face of the membership agreement. Petitioner’s belief that the contract was mandatory is irrelevant.

    The Court concluded by stating that “[T]he First Amendment protects our right to speak. It does not create an independent right to void obligations when we are unhappy with what we have said.”

    Mary H. Bandstra, IASB Law Clerk


     
  • Freedom of Information Act - FOIA
    Evidentiary and Discovery Rules Do Not Exempt from Disclosure Private Attorney’s Letter on Behalf of Clients
    Case: Public Access Opinion 22-013
    Decision Date: Tuesday, November 22, 2022
    On October 26, 2021, Requestor submitted a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request on behalf of the Chicago Tribune to the City of Chicago Department of Law (Department) seeking copies of certain emails. On November 9, 2021, the Department provided copies of records but withheld a letter submitted by a private attorney on behalf of clients pursuant to section 7(1)(a) of FOIA. The Department argued that evidentiary rules prohibited disclosure of the letter because it concerned settlement negotiations. On November 11, 2021, Requester submitted a Request for Review to the Public Access Counselor (PAC) contesting the denial.

    On July 22, 2022, the PAC issued a non-binding determination that the Department improperly denied the letter and requested that it provide Requestor with a copy. On August 26, 2022, the Department informed the PAC that it would not comply. The PAC subsequently issued this binding opinion on the matter.

    The Department’s denial of the request was based on the premise that the letter in question documents privileged settlement negotiations and is prohibited from being disclosed by evidentiary and discovery rules. The PAC noted, however, that the letter does not propose or demand a settlement that would resolve the matter or request that the Department engage in negotiations concerning a possible settlement. Thus, the PAC found that the Department had not demonstrated that the letter reflects settlement negotiations encompassed by evidentiary and discovery rules. 

    The PAC further reasoned that even if the letter could be construed to be part of a settlement negotiation, is not exempt under the FOIA exemptions the Department asserted. The PAC explained that Federal Rule of Evidence 408, Federal Rule of Evidence 501, Illinois Rule of Evidence 408, Illinois Rule of Evidence 501, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b), and Illinois Supreme Court Rule 201(b) are judicial rules governing discovery and the admission of evidence in court proceedings. Restrictions on the discovery of information and the admissibility of evidence in court proceedings are inapplicable to the public’s statutory right to obtain information pursuant to FOIA. Such rules do not provide a basis for denying records under section 7(1)(a).

    The Department additionally cited Section 7(1)(f) of FOIA. The PAC noted that, to be exempt under section 7(1)(f), a record must be 1) inter-agency or intra-agency, and 2) pre-decisional and deliberative. The letter that the Department withheld was prepared by a private attorney on behalf of clients with interest independent from the Department’s interests. Because the letter is not an intra-agency or inter-agency communication, or a pre-decisional and deliberative record, it is not exempt from disclosure pursuant to section 7(1)(f) of FOIA.

    The PAC ordered the Department to provide Requestor with a copy of the responsive letter.

    This opinion is binding only to the parties involved and may be appealed pursuant to State law.

    Mary H. Bandstra, IASB Law Clerk
     
  • Open Meetings Act - OMA
    Improper Closed Session Discussion under the Exemption for Purchasing or Leasing Real Property
    Case: Public Access Opinion 22-012
    Decision Date: Friday, September 30, 2022
    On July 6, 2022, Requestor submitted a Request for Review to the PAC complaining that the Board of Education of Decatur Public School District No. 61 (School Board) had violated OMA by discussing building a new grade school with COVID-19 relief funds in closed sessions under the section 2(c)(5) exception.

    Section 2(c)(5) permits public bodies to close a portion of the meeting to discuss “the purchase or lease of real property for the use of the public body, including meetings held for the purpose of discussing whether a particular parcel should be acquired.”

    After reviewing minutes and verbatim recordings from several closed meetings between October 21, 2021 and June 28, 2022, the PAC concluded that the School Board had exceeded the scope of the exception. While discussion about potential sites for the new school may be held in closed sessions, the broader discussion about building a new school with COVID-19 relief funds was beyond the limited scope of the exception.

    The PAC ordered the public body to make publicly available the closed session verbatim recordings and closed session minutes of the meetings. The limited portions relevant to acquiring particular properties may be redacted.

    This opinion is binding only to the parties involved and may be appealed pursuant to State law.

    Michelle Yang, IASB Law Clerk

     
  • General Interest to School Officials
    Blocking Parents From Board Trustees’ Social Media Pages Violated Parents’ Free Speech Rights
    Case: Garnier v. O’Connor-Ratcliff, 41 F.4th 1158 (9th Cir. 2022).
    Decision Date: Wednesday, July 27, 2022
    In November 2014, while running for election to the Poway Unified School District Board of Trustees (Board), two individuals (Trustees) created public Facebook pages to promote their campaigns. After winning their elections, Trustees changed the descriptions of their pages to state they were now government officials, and they continued to use their Facebook pages to post content related to district business. One Trustee also created a Twitter page related to her official duties. In their posts, Trustees invited the public to fill out surveys, shared information about upcoming events, and reported on Board action. Trustees did not establish any rules of etiquette or decorum regulating how the public was to interact with the pages.

    Constituents who frequently commented on Trustees’ posts included Christopher and Kimberly Garnier (Parents), who had children attending the district and had been active in the district community for years, regularly attending Board meetings and emailing the Board about their concerns. Parents began posting lengthy and repetitive comments on Trustees’ social media pages. Frustrated with Parents’ repetitive posts, Trustees began deleting or hiding the posts and Trustees eventually blocked Parents from the pages. Then, Trustees began using Facebook’s word filter feature to effectively prevent all verbal comments on the pages. Parents filed a Section 1983 suit alleging Trustees violated their First Amendment rights by blocking Parents from public fora (the social media pages) and sought damages and declaratory and injunctive relief.

    The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California (District Court) granted Trustees qualified immunity as to the damages claim but allowed the case to proceed. Following a bench trial, the District Court found that Trustees’ social media pages were designated public fora and that Trustees’ decision to block Parents was content neutral and intended “to enforce an unwritten rule of decorum prohibiting repetitious speech on their social media pages.” Even so, the District Court granted judgment to Parents and awarded costs because Trustees’ indefinite blocking of Parents was not narrowly tailored to avoid repetitive comments.

    Trustees appealed, arguing that they closed any public fora they had created on their social media pages when they blocked almost all comments using word filters, so Parents’ case was moot. The Appeals Court did not buy this argument, noting that Facebook word filters did not stop the public from reacting to posts (e.g., with a “like” or emoticons) and that Twitter did not have word filters. The Appeals Court affirmed that Trustees’ social media conduct was sufficiently related to their official duties to mean that they constituted state action (even if the Board did not fund or authorize them) because their posts concerned or promoted district business and the pages did not contain any disclaimer that the “statements made on this web site reflect the personal opinions of the author” and “are not made in any official capacity.” The Appeals Court also affirmed that Trustees violated Parents’ First Amendment rights when they blocked Parents from the social media pages and that Parents were entitled to relief.

    While the Appeals Court noted that not every social media account operated by a public official is a government account and that specific facts and circumstances must be weighed, this case is an important reminder of factors that board members should consider when operating social media pages, including but not limited to: how the page is described and used, how members of the public and government regard and treat the page, whether the page has any rules of etiquette and decorum, and whether the page contains any disclaimers.