A public body may not meet in a private residence, even when it gives a proper notice and posting of the meeting to the public. Here, a public body called a special meeting due to impending statutory time constraints. The public body knew that its routine meeting location would be closed for a holiday on the special meeting’s date, so it chose a public official’s private residence as the meeting location. The meeting location was not “convenient and open to the public” because a private residence could “reasonably be expected to deter citizens from attending the gathering. Citizens may have felt uncomfortable going to a public official’s home to attend a meeting. In this sense, the private residence was ‘ill-suited’ for a public meeting.”

Names of State University students and graduation information were categorized by the University as “directory information.” Directory information is not exempt from disclosure under Sections 7(1)(a),7(1)(b), or 7(1)(c) of FOIA.

The facts of this case began in an online chat on a suburban newspaper's comment board. The chat was between two individuals (one later identified as a minor) who posted various sarcastic comments about a local election under anonymous screen names. The minor's mother, a candidate in the election, was the subject of much of the chatter.

Using Supreme Court Rule 224 (Ill. S. Ct. R. 224), she ultimately filed a petition on her son's behalf, seeking the discovery of a commenter’s identity (referred to as John Doe). The comments were allegedly defamatory of her child. Initially, the trial court ordered that the identity of the subscriber to the internet protocol (IP) address used by John Doe when posting on the website would be revealed to petitioner.

John Doe appealed. He asserted that the trial court applied the wrong standard because the challenged comments were not defamatory. John Doe also contended that the challenged comments were immune by the Citizen Participation Act, which protects the constitutional rights of citizens and organizations to be involved and participate freely in the process of government.

The appellate court held that John Doe’s identity should not be revealed because the minor’s mother did not allege enough facts to show a cause of action for defamation, which is required under Ill. S. Ct. R. 224. Based upon its ruling, the court did not address John Doe’s assertion that the challenged comments were immune by the Citizen Participation Act. However, this case serves as a reminder to elected officials that citizens have broad First Amendment rights that require elected officials to have thick skin.

The school board properly followed procedural requirements of Sections 34-8.3(a), (b), and (c) of School Code (Section 34 applies to Chicago Public Schools). Those sections apply to the removal of principals for schools on probation. The school board's decision to remove the Plaintiff as a principal was not against manifest weight of evidence.

A former school board member appealed the court order that “ousted” him from serving on a school board for violating the Public Officer Prohibited Activities Act (50 ILCS 105/). That statute prohibits duly holding offices on both a county board and a school board. A few fellow school board members brought an action in “quo warranto” to enforce this law because the former board member was a member of the county board when he was sworn in to the school board. (“Quo warranto” is a legal proceeding that challenges an individual's right to hold an office or governmental privilege.) The appellate court found, among other things, that the court order at the time was proper. Note: During the course of this case, the former school board member ran for the school board again at the next election, and he was elected, sworn in, and is currently serving. For more information about incompatible offices, see the discussion in the Illinois Council of School Attorney’s document titled “Answers to FAQs; Conflict of Interest and Incompatible Offices,” at http://iasb.com/law/FAQsConflictofInterestIncompatibleOffices.pdf.