Shari Gottlieb, a self-employed web designer, volunteered her services and designed a website which was used by Citizens for Wilmette Schools (committee). She sent the committee notice of an in-kind contribution valuing her work at $3,435. The committee did not file a schedule A-1 form for Gottlieb’s work, which is required for contributions greater than $1,000. After the election, the committee included Gottlieb’s work in its quarterly D-2 report, but later amended the D-2 to remove Gottlieb’s work. Wilmette resident Herbert Sorock filed a complaint with the Illinois State Board of Elections (board) which was dismissed.

Sorock appealed the dismissal arguing that the board improperly interpreted two relevant provisions of the election code. Sorock argued that Gottlieb’s time was an in-kind contribution under the statute and should have been reported. Alternatively, he argued that Gottlieb’s work meets the statutory definition of an electioneering communication and was therefore subject to disclosure. The court agreed with the board’s decision that Gottlieb’s work was not an in-kind contribution. The section of the statute which defines contributions provides that “any individual services provided voluntarily and without promise or expectation of compensation from any source shall not be deemed a contribution”. The court agreed with the board’s decision that Gottlieb’s work qualified for this exception and was not a contribution. The court concluded that the work could not be an electioneering communication because it did not communicate anything. As a web designer, Gottlieb had designed and programmed a graphical layout but had not authored the language of the site. The court affirmed the decision of the board, dismissing Sorock’s complaint.

Jared Boyer, IASB Extern

5 ILCS 120/2(c)(1) is not intended to allow closed session discussion of fiscal matters, notwithstanding that they may directly or indirectly impact the employees of the public body. The facts in this opinion involved discussions in closed session that centered on broader budgetary concerns, such as staffing needs, how staff reductions would affect the services provided by the public body, and which services were most valuable to the public body’s residents. While the discussions of budgetary concerns did lead to discussions that are allowed under 5 ILCS 120/2(c)(1), they should have been held in open session.

Rules that require advance notice to the public body before recording a meeting violate the OMA. Here, a public body prohibited a citizen from recording its meeting because the citizen failed to provide advance notice that he would record the meeting. The public body’s rules required advance notice of the recording. The public body’s reason for its rule was so the public body’s clerk could ensure a citizen could get his or her equipment through the security checkpoint and to notify the public body of the recording. A public body may limit the right of the public to record open meetings only pursuant to prescribed rules, and then only to the extent that those rules are designed to prevent disruptions or avoid safety hazards and do not unduly interfere with the right to record. This public body’s rule was not reasonable or necessary to prevent interference with public meetings or protect the safety of those in attendance.

The Tribune sought to gain access to information regarding the identities and addresses of the parents of applicants to the University of Illinois. They submitted a request citing the Illinois Freedom of Information Act, which the University denied. The University cited an exemption allowing them to withhold information prohibited from disclosure by state or federal law as the reason for the denial. The court did not allow the case to proceed, stating that a federal court would not have subject-matter jurisdiction. Because the case was about interpreting the Illinois Freedom of Information Act, a state law of Illinois, the case would need to be heard by an Illinois State Court.

Jared Boyer, IASB Extern

The following case is binding in the jurisdiction of the Illinois Appellate Court Third Circuit. Its content may be of interest to school officials in Illinois. It involves a “quo warranto” action. “Quo warranto” actions used to challenge another's right to public office. For more information on quo warranto actions, see the last paragraph below.

Parker, a candidate for the school board, had two felony convictions and filed his papers to become a candidate for his local school board. The State’s Attorney sought a court order to remove Parker’s name from the ballot and stop him from running for the school board. The basis for the request was that Parker was not eligible to run because his felony convictions disqualified him from holding public office pursuant to section 29-15 of the Election Code (10 ILCS 5/29-15). The trial court granted the State's quo warranto motion and barred General Parker from placing his name on the ballot. On appeal, the appellate court upheld the order barring General Parker from placing his name on the ballot.

Quo warranto cases are generally only brought by the Attorney General or the appropriate State's Attorney. If neither of them brings the suit, it may be brought by any citizen after s/he has requested the AG and State's Attorney to bring the same, they fail to do so, and the circuit court grants permission for the citizen to file it. After receiving permission to bring the suit, the citizen must post a bond when filing the proceeding because, if s/he is unsuccessful, s/he must pay the defendant’s attorney fees and costs. Depending upon the alleged violation, the law allows the court to impose a $25,000 fine or remove the board member from office.

A copy of this case is available at the following location:

www.state.il.us/court/R23_Orders/AppellateCourt/2012/3rdDistrict/3110140_R23.pdf