The public body must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that records are exempt from disclosure pursuant to section 7(1)(c). A 7(1)(c) personal privacy exemption claim requires the balancing of the public’s interest in disclosure of certain information against the individual’s privacy interest. Close family members of a decedent may have a right of privacy in the disclosure of records concerning the decedent. To determine if the public interest outweighs any privacy rights four factors are considered and weighed: (1) the requester’s interest in disclosure, (2) the public interest in disclosure, (3) the degree of invasion of personal privacy, and (4) the availability of alternative means of obtaining the requested information.

This opinion is binding only to the parties involved and may be appealed pursuant to State law.

Shanell M. Bowden, IASB Law Clerk

The Illinois Supreme Court has held that a school district is subject to, and its school board must comply with, local government zoning and storm water restrictions, i.e., a city’s zoning powers. The case arose when neighbors to a high school didn’t like the bleachers being built in the football stadium. The city issued a stop-order against the board prohibiting the continuation of the work on the bleachers. The neighbors sued the district seeking to privately enforce the city’s zoning ordinances. The court considered the board’s arguments supporting its position that the city may not restrict a school district’s land use. The court disagreed in an opinion that reads like a reply brief. The court relied on a provision in the School Code expressly allowing boards to seek zoning changes, variations, or special new uses for properties held or controlled by the school district. The court reasoned that this provision demonstrates that the legislature intended to subject the local school board to the municipality’s zoning regulations.

The public body violated section 3(d) of FOIA by failing to respond to a request for records within five business days without a written agreement to extend the time for compliance.

The calendar the public body produced qualifies as a public record under section 2 (c) of FOIA. An employee of the public body prepared and maintained the calendar. The public body used the calendar to schedule official meetings and other governmental events. Additionally, an unspecified number of members of the public body had access to the calendar.

The public body violated the requirements of FOIA by failing to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that portions of the records are exempt from disclosure under section 7(1)(f)(exemption for predecisional and deliberative material) or section 7(1)(m). The public body did not meet its burden to redact information pursuant to 7(1)(m) because it failed to demonstrate that the redacted information could reveal the substance of confidential attorney-client discussions. The simple presence of an attorney in a meeting is not enough to demonstrate that section 7(1)(m) applies.

This opinion is binding only to the parties involved and may be appealed pursuant to State law.

Shanell M. Bowden, IASB Law Clerk

Service learning hours required by the school district did not constitute a form of involuntary servitude. Section 27-22 of School Code allows school districts the freedom to add additional graduation requirements based on certain needs of their students and communities in their districts. Section 27-22.3 of School Code does not prohibit districts from requiring students to complete community service hours as an additional graduation requirement. A requirement of 24 hours of community service over four years is not unreasonable, onerous, or unduly burdensome.

Shanell M. Bowden, IASB Law Clerk

A transgender boy student claimed that the school board’s bathroom policy that prohibited him from using the bathroom that corresponds with his gender identity amounted to sex discrimination under Title IX. The court found that Department of Education regulation 34 C.F.R. § 106.33 allows schools to provide separate bathroom facilities based upon sex, so long as the bathrooms are comparable. Therefore, the school board policy did not violate Title IX by limiting the student to the bathrooms assigned to his biological sex. The court found that the school board was protecting a constitutional right to bodily privacy while the student wanted to overturn a “tradition of segregating bathrooms based on biological differences between the sexes.”

The court denied the student’s request for an order allowing him to resume using the boys’ restroom while the court ruled on his Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claim.

While this case does not apply in Illinois, transgender or gender nonconforming student rights is a developing and important area. School officials should continue to monitor cases on this topic.

Shanell M. Bowden, IASB Law Clerk