This binding opinion from the Illinois Attorney General’s Public Access Counselor (PAC) discusses an issue under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) of whether the City of Chicago (City) Department of Finance (Department) improperly withheld a record responsive to a FOIA request for settlement-related records.

It is the public policy of the State of Illinois that "all persons are entitled to full and complete information regarding the affairs of government." 5 ILCS 140/1. Under FOIA, "(a]ll records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be open to inspection or copying. Any public body that asserts that a record is exempt from disclosure has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that it is exempt." 5 ILCS 140/1.2. Section 7(1)(m) of FOIA exempts from disclosure: “Communications between a public body and an attorney or auditor representing the public body that would not be subject to discovery in litigation, and materials prepared or compiled by or for a public body in anticipation of a criminal, civil or administrative proceeding upon the request of an attorney advising the public body, and materials prepared or compiled with respect to internal audits of public bodies. A party asserting that a communication to an attorney is protected by the attorney-client privilege must show that "(1) a statement originated in confidence that it would not be disclosed; (2) it was made to an attorney acting in his legal capacity for the purpose of securing legal advice or services; and (3) it remained confidential." Cangelosi v. Capasso, 366 Ill. App. 3d 225, 228 (2006). A public body that withholds records under section 7(1)(m) "can meet its burden only by providing some objective indicia that the exemption is applicable under the circumstances." Illinois Education Ass'n v. Illinois State Board of Education, 204 Ill. 2d 456, 470 (2003).

Here, the PAC reviewed the settlement record at issue and was unable to find an indication that legal advice was sought or provided or that the City attorney who signed the record was acting as the Alderman's attorney in connection with the settlement. The City had been dismissed from the case and the Alderman was represented by private counsel. Although part of the record briefly explains the City's involvement in the settlement, neither that statement nor any other portion of the record renders legal advice to the Alderman or indicates that the Alderman sought legal advice pertaining to the litigation and settlement from the City attorney. Rather, the withheld record is a document concerning the settlement which is signed by the Alderman and an attorney with the City's Law Department. The City attorney was representing the City while the Alderman had his own attorney, and the parties had separate interests in the subject that the withheld record addresses.

In addition, the PAC cited to the Illinois Constitution at Article VIII, section 1(c), which provides that "[r]eports and records of the obligation, receipt and use of public funds of the State, units of local government and school districts are public records available for inspection by the public according to law." The constitutional right to information regarding the use of public funds is incorporated into the provisions of FOIA. 5 ILCS 140/2.5. ("All records relating to the obligation, receipt, and use of public funds of the State, units of local government, and school districts are public records subject to inspection and copying by the public.").

The PAC concluded that the public has a constitutional right to know the purposes for which public funds are expended. Because the withheld settlement record relates to such a purpose and because it is not a communication protected by the attorney-client privilege, the Department did not sustain its burden of proving that the record is exempt from disclosure under section 7(1)(m) of FOIA.

A copy of the decision can be found here.
 

On June 12, 2025, the U.S. Supreme Court (Court) issued its opinion in A.J.T., et al. v. Osseo Area Schools, Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 279, et al.  The Court vacated the 8^th circuit court’s decision and remanded the case while setting forth that the same standard must be applied by courts in cases involving alleged failures to accommodate students with disabilities under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (Rehabilitation Act) as in other disability discrimination contexts. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the unanimous opinion for the Court. 

Petitioner A. J. T. is a young female student who suffers from seizures throughout the day that create safety concerns and interfere with her capacity to learn. Her seizures are so frequent in the morning that she “can’t attend school before noon,” however, she is “alert and able to learn” from noon until about 6 p.m. Until middle school, she had been provided reasonable accommodation although at a reduced number of hours for her school day compared with other students. Prior to the start of middle school, the school district proposed further cutting back the length of her school day. A. J. T.’s parents had requested that she receive evening instruction and schooling hours comparable to her nondisabled peers, however, school administrators again denied those requests and also rejected proposals to maintain at least the same length instructional day that A. J. T. had been receiving in elementary school. A. J. T.’s parents filed an IDEA complaint with the Minnesota Department of Education, alleging that the school’s refusal to provide after-hours instruction denied A. J. T. a free appropriate public education. The parents were successful on the IDEA complaint.

A. J. T. and her parents also sued the school district and the Osseo School Board (collectively, the District) in federal court, alleging violations of Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The courts below held that A. J. T.’s claims under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act could not go forward because she had not shown that school officials acted with “bad faith or gross misjudgment.” That heightened standard, the lower courts explained, applies uniquely in the educational services context and requires a more demanding showing compared to other sorts of disability discrimination claims.

The Supreme Court found there was no evidence in the statutory language or legislative history that supported imposing such a high burden on students when other groups with disabilities would not be required to show bad faith or gross misjudgment to bring a discrimination claim. As a result, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the student and determined that students with disabilities filing claims under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act are held to the same standard as other individuals alleging disability discrimination in different contexts.

A copy of the case can be found here. 

The Illinois Supreme Court upheld the conviction of a 16-year-old Stevenson High School student for driving under the influence (DUI) during a driver’s education class.
The Village of Lincolnshire (Village) brought state DUI charges against the student, who was later found guilty in a bench trial. The student appealed and his case made its way to the Illinois Supreme Court, where he argued that the Village lacked authority to prosecute the DUI, and that the evidence was insufficient to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of DUI.
 

First, the student claimed that the Village lacked authority to prosecute the DUI because it failed to present written permission from the State authorizing the Village to prosecute the case under state statute. The parties agreed that the Village did have such written permission in this case. The statute at issue does not require the Village to submit its written permission into the record. Both the Appellate Court and the Illinois Supreme Court rejected the arguments presented, and held that the statute does not require the Village to submit written authority into the record at trial.
 

Second, the student argued that the Village failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was under the influence of cannabis, and that it was to a degree that “rendered him incapable of safely driving.” In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the  court must determine whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found the required elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
 

The Illinois Supreme Court noted that at trial, the Village presented testimony from the driver’s education teacher, who observed many concerns with the student’s driving that day. The student did not look over his shoulder or check the car’s rearview mirror when backing out. While driving, the student veered into the outside lane as he turned left into the inside lane, causing the teacher to grab the wheel to avoid a car approaching on the right, and the student continued veering left and right as he drove down the road. The teacher grabbed the wheel several times to put the student back into the proper lane. As the student approached a stop sign, the teacher had to use the brake on his side of the car to stop the vehicle because defendant “wasn’t going to come to a complete stop,” and again had to use the brake when the student approached a stoplight. After the drive, the Dean assigned to the student was called. The Dean spoke with defendant and testified that his speech was slow, he was confused, and he could not respond quickly to questioning. The Dean was concerned and walked the student to the nurse’s office thinking the student needed to be checked out medically. Afterwards, the Dean interviewed the student, who told her that he had been up all night because he had been using marijuana in the evening and that his mother caught him.
 

Given the admission about using marijuana, the Dean called another dean of students at the high school, and asked for a student search of defendant. That other dean searched the student and found a skinny, white, rolled object in the student’s wallet. The student said that it was a marijuana cigarette.  The Dean then called a Village police officer who was employed by the high school as a school resource officer. The resource officer conducted a balance assessment on the student, who kept falling over, losing his balance and catching himself with his other foot or his hand. After failing the field sobriety tests, the officer informed the student that he would be arrested. Additional evidence was submitted into the record of surveillance footage from the high school showing the student stumbling through the school hallways before exiting to the driver’s education vehicle. In addition, field sobriety tests were conducted in the booking room at the police station. Those tests were video recorded, admitted into evidence, and played for the trial court. That police officer also determined that the student was under the influence. The trial court found defendant guilty of DUI (cannabis).
 

When viewing all evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the evidence supported a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the student was under influence of cannabis and was incapable of safely driving, upholding his conviction.
 

A copy of the case is available here.
 

In April 2025, the Federal District Court for the Northern District of Illinois (District Court) issued an opinion allowing a school employee’s First Amendment retaliation claim to proceed to trial. In the case, the Executive Director of Student Services (Director) of a school district (School District) was employed by the School District under a one-year contract for the 2021-2022 school year. During the spring of 2022, the Director began a campaign for County Regional Superintendent of Schools, which is a political position unrelated to her employment with the School District. The Director held a gun raffle to raise campaign contributions in May 2022 shortly after the Uvalde, Texas school shooting. She advertised the gun raffle on her personal Facebook page. Within weeks of posting the advertisement, the Director was placed on paid administrative leave by the School District for the remaining term of her employment contract.
 

The Director filed a lawsuit against the School District, claiming she was terminated and her contract was not renewed in retaliation for her post about the gun raffle. The Director argued that the School District’s actions constituted a breach of her employment contract and that they violated her First Amendment right to free speech. The School District defended its decision because of her poor performance, which was contested.
 

The Court went through a balancing test to evaluate the First Amendment violation claim specifically whether the Director’s interest in speaking as a private citizen outweighed the School District’s interest in maintaining orderly operations. First, the Court found that the raffle advertisement was posted in the Director’s personal capacity, since it related to her campaign for public office that was separate from her employment. Second, in evaluating whether the Director’s post interfered with the School District’s operations, the District Court considered the actual impact of her post on the school community based on several factors, including whether the post disrupted harmony among co-workers, whether the post interfered with the Director’s job duties, and the context of the post.
 

The School District argued that the advertisement was very disruptive, since it was posted around the same time of the school shooting in Uvalde, Texas, and staff had raised concerns about the Director’s judgment in advertising a gun raffle at that time. The Director argued that the School District had misconstrued the post because the post was made to her personal Facebook page, and she had not discussed the raffle while at work. Further, she argued her campaign did not impact her ability to do her job as Director.
 

Taking all the factors into consideration, the District Court found that the School District failed to show that the post unduly interfered with its operations or the Director’s performance of her duties. Because the School District had not shown that its interests outweighed those of the Director in speaking freely, it did not meet its burden for summary judgment. The District Court ruled in favor of the School District on the breach of contract claims. The District Court denied the School District's motion for summary judgment on the Director’s First Amendment retaliation claim and determined that the claim could move forward to trial.
 

This is a copy of the decision.