The City of Bunker Hill (City) violated FOIA by deleting, and thus failing to provide, a requested record in response to a FOIA request. On September 12, 2019, the Requestor requested the audio recorded minutes from the City’s Committee of the Whole meeting on September 11, 2019. On September 19, 2019, the City returned the FOIA request form the Requestor had completed with a handwritten note in the margin stating that the City’s attorney had stated on September 18, 2019 that the September 11, 2019 meeting was not an actually meeting because there was no quorum present and so there was no need to fulfill the FOIA request. The next day, the Requestor submitted the matter to the PAC for review.

When the PAC phoned the City on October 4, 2019, it was informed that the audio recording was deleted after the City received Requestor’s FOIA request. Further investigation revealed that upon the City attorney’s advice, the City deleted the audio recording after the attorney had advised that the September 11, 2019 meeting was not an actual meeting.

The PAC first determined that the audio recording was a “public record” under FOIA Section 2(c), which defines public records to include all records – including recordings – in the possession of a public body which pertain to the transaction of public business. The PAC next determined that the City possessed the audio recording when it received the FOIA Request, and no provision of FOIA authorizes a public body to destroy responsive records after receiving a FOIA request. Thus, the City should have either provided the audio recording to the Requestor or issued a proper denial in accordance with Section 9(a) of FOIA. As a result, the PAC ordered the City to determine whether it could retrieve the deleted recording and, if so, provide the Request with a copy. It further ordered the City to create protocols to ensure that, in the future, it appropriately complies with FOIA requests and that it preserve responsive records after receiving a FOIA request for them.

This opinion is binding only to the parties involved and may be appealed pursuant to State law.

In August 2015, journalist Bruce Rushton (Rushton) filed a FOIA request with the Illinois Department of Corrections (DOC) seeking all settlement agreements connected with the death of an inmate, including any agreements involving private entities charged with providing health care to the inmate, such as Wexford Health Services (Wexford). DOC did not have a copy of the settlement agreement and requested it from Wexford. Wexford begrudgingly turned over a redacted copy of the settlement agreement but refused to turn over an unredacted copy. DOC then provided Rushton with the redacted copy. Rushton then filed suit in the Sangamon County Circuit Court (Circuit Court) against DOC for violating FOIA, and Wexford intervened. At issue was whether Section 7(2) of FOIA applied to the settlement agreement. Section 7(2) provides that:
 
A public record that is not in the possession of a public body bus is in the possession of a party with whom the agency has contracted to perform a governmental function on behalf of the public body, and that directly relates to the governmental function and is not otherwise exempt under this Act, shall be considered a public record of the public body.
 
Wexford argued the settlement agreement did not “directly relate” to the governmental function it performed for DOC because it “simply memorializes its independent business decision to settle a legal claim.” Rushton argued the opposite, reasoning that the settlement related to a claim that Wexford failed to properly perform its governmental function (providing medical care to prisoners). The Circuit Court agreed with Wexford, Rushton appealed, and the appellate court reversed.
 
Wexford then appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court (Supreme Court), where it again argued that the settlement agreement did not “directly relate” to its governmental function and also argued that the settlement agreement was not a “public record” under Section 2.20 of FOIA. Section 2.20 states:
 
All settlement agreements entered into by or on behalf of a public body are public records subject to inspection and copying by the public, provided that information exempt from disclosure under Section 7 of this Act may be redacted.
 
Wexford asserted that because Section 2.20 does not mention private contractors, it did not apply to them. Looking to the intent of FOIA, the Supreme Court found that public records are presumed to be open and accessible, meaning that FOIA is to be accorded liberal construction and its exemptions are to be construed narrowly. It further stated that Section 2.20 could not be read in isolation from Section 7(2), and held that the legislature intended settlement agreements to be public records. The Supreme Court was also not swayed by Wexford’s argument that the settlement agreement did not “directly relate” to its governmental function, holding instead that the connection was both “direct and obvious.” The Supreme Court ruled the settlement agreement was disclosable, and remanded the matter to the Circuit Court to review whether any portions of the settlement agreement should be redacted as exempt under various other provisions of FOIA. This case serves as a reminder to public bodies that settlement agreements are broadly construed to be disclosable under FOIA, regardless of whether the agreement was entered with a private contractor so long as the contractor was performing a governmental function.

The Newton City Council (City) violated OMA by approving an ordinance without providing sufficient advance notice of that final action on the meeting agenda.

On its August 20, 2019 meeting agenda, the City listed the following as Agenda item 8.d.: “[c]onsider and act on Ordinance 19-11 to Amend Section 33-4-4(F).” The agenda did not specify what Ordinance 19-11 concerned and this omission was submitted to the PAC for review.

Section 2.02(c) of OMA states that, “[a]ny agenda required under this Section shall set forth the general subject matter of any resolution or ordinance that will be the subject of final action at the meeting.” The PAC noted that while the term “general subject matter” is ambiguous, legislative debate on Section 2.02(c) indicates the General Assembly intended that agendas provide sufficient detail to notify members of the public of the types of final actions public bodies anticipate taking at their meetings. Because Agenda item 8.d. only provided an ordinance number and did not identify the general subject matter at issue – application fees for permits - or incorporate the relevant City Code provision by reference or hyperlink, the City violated Section 2.02(c). As a result, the PAC ordered the City to reconsider its August 20, 2019 final action on the fee ordinance at a properly noticed meeting with an agenda containing the general subject matter of that ordinance.

This opinion is binding only to the parties involved and may be appealed pursuant to State law.
 

The Cook County Assessor’s Office (Assessor) violated Section 3(d) of FOIA by failing to respond to a FOIA request.

Requestor emailed a FOIA request to the Assessor on July 9, 2019, seeking “all applications for permits, permits, denials of permits and correspondence related to” five properties located in Lincolnwood, Illinois from January 1, 1950 to July 9, 2019. Requestor did not receive a response to his request.

On July 26, 2019, Requestor submitted a Request for Review to the PAC, alleging that the Assessor failed to respond to his FOIA request. On August 1, 2019, the PAC forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to the Assessor and asked the Assessor whether or not it had received and responded to Requestor’s request. The Assessor did not respond to the PAC. As of the date this binding opinion, neither Requestor nor the PAC had received a response from the Assessor’s Office.

Section 3(d) of FOIA states that “each public body shall, promptly, either comply with or deny a request for public records within 5 business days after its receipt of the request…” Because the Assessor did not comply with Section 3(d), the PAC ordered the Assessor to take immediate and appropriate action to provide Requestor with all records responsive to his request, subject only to permissible redactions.

This opinion is binding only to the parties involved and may be appealed pursuant to State law.

The City of Waukegan (City) violated FOIA by refusing to disclose office-worn body camera recordings of the arrest and death of a suspect.

On July 1, 2019, a Waukegan resident (Requestor) submitted a FOIA request to the City for copies of “"all dash Cam, body camera video and audio recordings leading up to as well as the attempted arrest and death of [the arrestee]…[on] Thursday, June 27, 2019." The City provided Requestor with some information from the incident, but denied the requested camera recordings based on Sections 7(1)(d)(i) and 7(1)(d)(vii) of FOIA and the Law Enforcement Officer-Worn Body Camera Act (Body Camera Act, 50 ILCS 706/). Section 7(1)(d)(i) of FOIA states that requests that “interfere with pending or actually and reasonably contemplated law enforcement proceedings conducted by any law enforcement…” may be exempt from FOIA. Section 7(1)(d)(vii) likewise exempts public bodies from FOIA requests that would, “obstruct an ongoing criminal investigation by the agency that is the recipient of the request.” Section 10-20(b) of the Body Camera Act states that “[r]ecordings made with the use of an officer-worn body camera are not subject to disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act.”

Requestor submitted a Request for Review to PAC on July 18, 2019, contesting the withholding of the camera recordings. The City responded by providing the PAC with copies of the responsive camera recordings, along with related records, and asserting that there were two open investigations related to the suspect. The City argued that “premature disclosure would inhibit impartial resolution" and that “disclosure presents a risk to the safety and the potential of intimidation of witnesses and their families.” The PAC rejected the City’s arguments for non-disclosure, finding them vague and stating that “[t]he City did not explain how disclosure would pose a risk to the life or physical safety of any person” and “did not set forth facts as to how disclosure of these particular body camera recordings would interfere with any ongoing investigation or other law enforcement proceedings.” Moreover, Section 10-20(b) of the Body Camera Act also provides that body camera recordings flagged “due to the filing of a complaint, discharge of a firearm, use of force, arrest or detention, or resulting death or bodily harm” must be disclosed pursuant to FOIA. The PAC ordered the City to immediately disclose copies of the recordings to the Requestor, subject only to any redactions required by the Body Camera Act.

This opinion is binding only to the parties involved and may be appealed pursuant to State law.